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Introduction
Tarzan entered the closed and silent cabin shunned by the apes.
Ignoring the three skeletons he found inside, Tarzan was most fascinated by a sharp hunting knife and a cupboard full of books. A few
of the books had pictures, some of which Tarzan recognized, but
some of which he did not. Most baffling of all were "the odd little
figures which appeared beneath and between the colored picturessome strange kind of bug he thought they might be, for many of
them had legs though nowhere could he find one with eyes and a
mouth."' It was Tarzan's first introduction to the letters of the alphabet and he was over ten years old. On his next visit, Tarzan noticed that the pictures of a small white ape like himself were always
accompanied by the three little bugs "B 0 Y" . Years later,
with the help of a huge illustrated dictionary, he had mastered the
simple, child's primer and had fully realized the true and wonderful
purpose of the funny little bugs. "Thus, at eighteen, we find him, an
English lordling, who could speak no English, and yet who could
read and write his native language. ' 2 Never since his unremembered infancy had Tarzan seen a human being other than
3
himself.
Tarzan and Sir William Blackstone had a lot in common. Both
were engaged in a project to attribute concrete meaning to assorted
combinations of funny little bugs on a page. Each sought to exclude, limit, or deny the plasticity of the printed word. Each, in his
1. E. BURROUGHS,
2. IdL at 64.
3. Id

TARZAN OF THE APES

43 (1914).

own way, looked for an enduring significance in written language, a
significance that transcends time, culture, or circumstance. In this
narrow sense, Tarzan and Blackstone were both "formalists." But
unconvincing aspects of the formalist enterprise have not escaped
attention. The most recent whistleblowers are the critical legal
studies movement.
Roberto Unger, one of the head honchos of this unruly bunch of
legal scholars and a sworn enemy of the formalists, boldly claims
that the critical legal studies movement has reformulated leftist
thought and practice in a manner that "redefine[s] the meaning of
radicalism." '4 He takes very considerable pains to distinguish the
work of this mutinous crew from that of both their colleagues and
their predecessors. Unger insists that the critical legal studies
movement has "transformed the received critique of formalism and
objectivism" into "more specific claims" that serve as the starting
points of a constructive program. 5 That program promises a "polit6
ical and cultural revolution."
This Essay suggests that Unger's attack on formalism and objectivism is not so new. After noting the early contributions of Thomas
Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham, it does so by particular reference to
the critique of William Sampson (1764-1836), the banished Irish
civil rights lawyer and political activist, who led an intellectual
charge upon the American common law more than a century and a
half ago. It also suggests that by depicting the common law as incompatible with the egalitarian ideal of a democratic republic,
Sampson sowed the seeds of a distinct radical tradition of which the
critical legal studies movement is but the most recent manifestation.
The effects of that radical tradition can be most widely seen in a
peculiarly instrumental American view of the common law and in
repeated challenges, both popular and academic, to the legitimacy
of judicial action.
After fierce attacks upon formalism and objectivism, both Sampson and Unger desperately try to salvage the rule of law. Sampson
puts his hope in codification, while Unger resorts to deviationist
doctrine. I argue that these constructive efforts, neither of which
escapes the brunt of their own critiques of formalism, result from a
shared radical dilemma. That dilemma is their common awareness
of the dual capacity of law to function not only as a means of social
control, but also as a normative force for social transformation.
Words kill. The caged violence of law is coveted as much by revolutionaries as by tyrants. Revolutions are the testing ground for law.
By isolating the role of violence in the rule of law following the
Easter Rising of 1916, this Essay concludes that law is as indispensable to the success of revolutions as it is to their prevention.
4. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567 (1983).
This work is also available in book form. R. UNGER, THE CRITCAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). Citations are to the article.
5. Unger, supra note 4, at 567.
6. Id. at 586.
r_ 9 0
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I.

Formalism and Objectivism

According to Unger's brief historical synopsis, leftist movements
in modern legal thought have traditionally been marked by two
traits. First, they have challenged both "formalism" and "objectivism."'7 Second, they have engaged in "the purely instrumental use
of legal practice and legal doctrine to advance leftist aims."" In Unger's assessment of the critical legal studies movement, these dual
themes have now been "reformulated" in the course of being drawn
into a larger body of ideas.9 He makes the arresting claim that
"[t]he results offer new insight into the struggle over power and
right, within and beyond the law, and they redefine the meaning of
radicalism." 10
Unger offers little further historical wisdom, leaving it unclear
how the critical legal studies movement has reformulated either of
the "overriding concerns" traditionally associated with the left. In a
lone footnote, he does distinguish between two main tendencies in
the movement. The first "sees past or contemporary doctrine as the
expression of a particular vision of society while emphasizing the
contradictory and manipulable character of doctrinal argument."'"
Unger notes that "[i]ts immediate antecedents lie in antiformalist2
legal theories and structuralist approaches to cultural history."'
The other tendency, according to Unger, "grows out of the social
theories of Marx and Weber and the mode of social and historical3
1
analysis that combines functionalist methods with radical aims."
Its central thesis is that "law and legal doctrine reflect, confirm, and
reshape the social divisions and hierarchies inherent in a type or
stage of social organization such as 'capitalism.' 114 But this latter
thesis departs from the assumption of "received leftist theory"' 5
that such institutional types or stages have a cohesive and foreordained character. Both tendencies of the critical legal studies movement shy away from "prescriptive and programmatic" thought,
perhaps because certain unstated "assumptions inherited from the
radical tradition" make it hard to turn constructive proposals into
6
more than statements of commitment or anticipations of history.'
I want to test Unger's claim that the critical legal studies movement has "transformed the received critique" and "redefine[d] the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
11ff%

1111

Id at 564, 566-67.
Id. at 567.
Id
Id.
Id at 563 n.1.
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
f-- C)f%

meaning of radicalism." 17 I begin by examining what Unger means
by the "formalism" and "objectivism" that leftist legal thinkers like
to attack. We will see for ourselves how his assault upon these concepts differs from that of earlier radicals.
A.

CapturingFormalism and Objectivism

Of late, largely due to Unger's work, formalism has basked in the
limelight. Unger takes it to mean "a commitment to, and therefore
also a belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justification that
can be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes about the basic
terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary." 1 8 Moreover, Unger's formalist believes that "only
through such a restrained, relatively apolitical method of analysis is
legal doctrine possible."' 9 By objectivism Unger means "the belief
that the authoritative legal materials-the system of statutes, cases,
and accepted legal ideas-embody and sustain a defensible scheme
of human association. They display, though always imperfectly, an
intelligible moral order." 20 Alternatively, continues Unger, "they
show the results of practical constraints upon social life-constraints
such as those of economic efficiency-that, taken together with constant human desires, have a normative force. The laws are not
merely the outcome of contingent power struggles or of practical
pressures lacking in rightful authority."'
In fact, neither formalism nor objectivism is a term with settled
meaning. In a recent attempt to define the formalism that invites so
much invective, Frederick Schauer identifies seven divergent uses of
the term by legal theorists of very different stripes. 22 For Karl
Llewellyn, formalism was an excessive reliance on the canonically
written language of rules. 23 H.L.A. Hart casts it as a refusal to ac24
knowledge the necessity of choice in the penumbral area of rules,
while Mark Tushnet describes it as an artificial narrowing of the
range of interpretive choices. 25 More pragmatically, perhaps, Morton Horwitz denounces formalism as a refusal to recognize the instrumental functions of law, 26 and Peter Strauss paints it as a refusal
27
to acknowledge the practical consequences of judicial decisions.
17. Id at 567.
18. Id at 564.
19. Id at 565.
20. Id.
21. Id
22. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 510 n.1 (1988).
23. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 183-88
(1962).
24. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-30 (1961).
25. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502,
1506-07 (1985).
26.: M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 254 (1977).
27. Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987).
AM)t
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Duncan Kennedy, another leader of the critical legal studies movement, uses formalism in a sense somewhat different from that of Unger. For Kennedy, formalism is a system of thought that identifies
some forms of collective intervention, such as the defense of private
property and the enforcement of contracts, with the protection of
individual freedom. 28 Despite these disagreements, Schauer believes that the notion of formalism does have descriptive content,
that at the heart of its various uses "lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule," and that the power of any rule assumes controlling strength in the language in which it is written. 29 Ernest
Weinrib, who joins Schauer in defending formalism against its many
modem critics, describes Unger's definition as "a valuable statement of formalism's principal themes [which] identifies the matter at
issue."'3 0 Grappling with Unger, however, Weinrib concludes that
law is rational, immanent, and normative.3 1 William Ewald much
less sympathetically diagnoses Unger's definitions of both formalism
and objectivism as suffering from "excessive vagueness" 3 2 and describes his definition of formalism as "so sloshy that he can do with
it whatever he wants." 3 3 Ewald, however, proposes no more con-

crete alternatives.
The cacophony subsides when we recall Unger's assertion that the
critical legal studies movement has transformed the "received critique" of formalism and objectivism. The extent of any transformation can be measured only against a common understanding of the
received critique. By identifying the intellectual target of that earlier critique, we can also hope to capture the twin bogeymen of formalism and objectivism that, according to Unger, leftist movements
in modem legal thought have characteristically sought to destroy.
B.

Roots of the Received Critique

So, what was the received critique? The critical legal studies
movement is often traced by outsiders to the legal realists' elaboration of the insights of Oliver Wendell Holmes. 4 Almost a hundred
years ago, Holmes argued that "a body of law is more rational and
28. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFALo L. REV. 205, 214
(1979); see also Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2J. LEGAL STuD. 351, 355 (1973).
29. Schauer, supra note 22, at 510.
30. Weinrib, Legal Formalim: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE LJ. 949,
953 (1988). Weinrib, however, recasts Unger's objectivism as simply another aspect of
formalism. Id
31. Id at 954.
32. Ewald, Unger's Philosophy: A CriticalLegal Study, 97 YALE LJ.665, 731 (1988).
33. Id at 729.
34. E.g., Alschuler, FailedPragmatism: Reflections on the BurgerCourt, 100 HARv.L. REV.
1436, 1454 (1987); Burton, Law as PracticalReason, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 747, 777, 780
(1989); Ewald, supra note 32, at 670-71; Fletcher, Why Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 427
(1987); Posner, TheJurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827, 879 (1988). But
1 f

ll"
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more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and
definitely to an end which it subserves." 35 But centuries before,
Thomas Hobbes had attacked the reverence for the common law
displayed by Blackstone's precursor, Edward Coke, provoking
Matthew Hale to rally to its defense. Relying on a new theory of
sovereignty, Hobbes denied that any custom of its own nature could
amount to the authority of a law. Hale responded by elevating practical convenience over such philosophical speculation.3 6 A more recent version of the received critique is identified by Kennedy, a
leading critical scholar (and one of only a handful of writers cited by
Unger), who sides with Jeremy Bentham's attack on Blackstone's
Commentaries more than two centuries ago.3 7 Kennedy's choice of

Blackstone as his own target tells us much about the conventional
embodiment of formalism and objectivism.
Kennedy speaks for the critical legal studies movement when he
says that the Commentaries "as a whole quite patently attempt to 'naturalize' purely social phenomena. They restate as 'freedom' what
we see as servitude. And they cast as rational order what we see as
something like chaos." 3 8 Kennedy finds Blackstone's utopian enterprise of legality "supremely unconvincing." 3 9 At least since
Bentham's Fragment on Government,40 he notes, "critics have linked
these traits of the Commentaries to Blackstone's desire to legitimate
the legal status quo of the England of his day."'4 1 Kennedy maintains that Blackstone accomplished his legitimating task by an artificial and suspect arrangement of the jumbled mass of common law
principles. Recently, pointing to the more innocent traces ofJustinian, Dionysius, Gothofredus and the faithful Hale in Blackstone's
categorization of the common law, Alan Watson has rejected Kennedy's argument that there was "a particular and precise political
42
and ideological motivation" for the structure of the Commentaries.
But Unger would surely agree with Kennedy that formalism and objectivism are embodied in the Commentaries; the received critique is
necessarily an assault on the ideology they represent.
As a sixteen-year-old student, Jeremy Bentham listened to Blackstone deliver the Commentaries in their original form as lectures at
see Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism'sResponse to Critical Legal
Studies, 65 TUL. L. REV. 15, passim (1990).
35. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.REV. 457, 469 (1897).
36. M. HALE, REFLECTIONS BY THE LORD CHIEFE JUSTICE HALE ON MR. HOBBES His
DIALOGUE OF THE LAWE, reprintedin 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 500

(2d ed. 1937); T. HOBBES, DIALOGUE OF THE COMMON LAW (1681), reprintedin T. HOBBES,

A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAws (J. Cropsey
ed. 1971). See generally W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 481-87; Yale, Hale and Hobbes on Law,
Legislation, and the Sovereign, 31 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 121 (1972).

37. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, supra note 28, at 211.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. J. BENTHAM], A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT; BEING AN EXAMINATION OF WHAT IS
DELIVERED ON THE SUBJECT OF GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL IN THE INTRODUCTION TO SIR
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ... (London 1776) [hereinafter FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT].

41. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, supra note 28, at 211.
42. Watson, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 97 YALE LJ. 795, 811-12 (1988).
r-VnT
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Oxford, but he heard them "with rebel ears" and was unimpressed. 43 Some years later, in 1776, Bentham anonymously published his Fragment on Government, a critique that challenged
Blackstone's notion of sovereignty and grew out of a larger, more
ambitious project to attack the Commentaries as a whole. In his preface to the Fragment on Government, Bentham described it as "a work,
the principal and remaining part of which may possibly see the light
some time or other under some such title as that of 'A Comment on
the Commentaries.' ,,44 His hesitancy was welljustified. The larger
and more comprehensive work was not published until a century
and a half later, during the heyday of legal realism, when an enterprising scholar found the forgotten manuscript gathering dust
amongst a bundle of Bentham's uncatalogued papers.4 5 Given this
significant delay, Kennedy's citation to Bentham's Comment on the
Commentaries hardly reveals the source of the received critique of
Blackstone.
In his other writings, Bentham frequently attacked the common
law, 46 but in its day his radical critique appears to have met with
relative indifference in America. Bentham's widespread reputation
as a utopian radical social reformer probably worked as more of a
hindrance than a help to his cause. Seeing the United States as a
possible laboratory for his experimental zeal, Bentham wrote to
President Madison in 1811 with the magnanimous offer to draft a
complete system of codified law in place of the existing system. War
intervened and it took Madison five years to reply. His answer was
no. 4 7 Similar offers to each of the twenty-five state governors
yielded Bentham no greater success. Although a few loyal Blackstonians rallied to the defense of the common law, 48 it took another
radical publicist-William Sampson-to author what has become
the "received critique" in terms powerful enough to shake the very
foundations of the American legal system.
In 1809, arguing his Trial of the Journeymen Cordwainers4 9 a couple
43. 1 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 249 (J.
Bowring comp. 1962)
[hereinafter J. BENTHAM, WORKS]; see also 10 id. at 45.
44. FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT,supra note 40, at viii-ix.
45. J. BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRrTCIsM OF WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (C.W. Everett ed. 1928).
46. See generally G.J. PosTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADION (1986).
47. Letters fromJeremy Bentham to James Madison (Oct. 1811) andJames Madison
to Jeremy Bentham (May 8, 1816), reprinted in 4 J. BENTHAM, WORKS, supra note 43, at
453, 467. See generally C. CooK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 97-106 (1981); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw

25-26 (1977).
48. Daniel Webster, for example, dismissed Bentham's codification proposal as one
of the "idlest and weakest theories of the age." [Webster], Wheaton's Reports, VoL III, 8 N.
AM. REV. 63, 65-66 (1818).
49. W. SAMPSON, TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS OF THE CrTY OF NEwYORK; FOR A CONSPIRACY TO RAISE THEIR WAGES .. . 32 (New York 1810) [hereinafter
.

-^

I I

^

A n

of years before Bentham's unrequited overtures to Madison, Sampson launched a ruthless assault upon the retention of the common
law system in the United States, calling for its replacement by a national code. His inflammatory rhetoric for the defendant strikers
created what Perry Miller called "a sensation of terror" in more
timid souls. 50 In 1823, Sampson's highly controversial Discourse on
the Common Law 5 l "electrified the public mind" and sparked off a
fierce debate on the form of law required in a republican democracy. 5 2 In his Discourse, Sampson directed his systemic attack against
what he saw as limitless power in the hands of an unrepresentative
judiciary, and renewed his call for codification in place of the common law. Through these works, and a barrage of propagandist writing in a range of American periodicals,5 s Sampson eclipsed
Bentham in his attacks on the classical jurisprudence represented by
Blackstone.
"You are one of the fathers of the [codification] system, which was
broached in this country, before it was taken up in England," wrote
Peter S. Du Ponceau, the Philadelphia jurist and writer, to his friend
Sampson in the summer of 1827. "I might even say you are the
Patriarch of it, the first inventor (Bentham excepted) who by the bye
was not much thought of before the trumpet was sounded from
here, with Samsonian strength." 54 Du Ponceau's impressions were
widely shared. A few months before Sampson's death the Baltimore
law teacher David Hoffman noted that the flamboyant Irish advocate
"was the first in our country to fix public attention on the subject of
legal reforms." 5 5 With his "more than Bentham zeal," continued
Hoffman, Sampson could
justly be regarded as the great promoter of the legal amendments,
the codes, and consolidations that have so far taken place among
us. His invectives, however, against the Common Law, were often
injudicious and indiscriminately severe, and his love of ridicule
often took the place of prudence, of reason and of useful
TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS]. The trial is
TARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIrTv 251

reprinted in full in 3 A DOCUMEN(J. Commons & E. Gilmore eds.

1958).
50. P.

MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 246 (1965).
51. W. SAMPSON, AN ANNIVERSARY DISCOURSE DELIVERED BEFORE THE HISTORICAL
SOCIETY OF NEW-YORK, ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1823; SHOWING THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, ANTIquITIES, CURIOSITIES, AND NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (New York 1824),
reprinted in SAMPSON'S DISCOURSE AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH VARIOUS LEARNEDJURISTS,
UPON THE HISTORY OF THE LAW, WITH THE ADDITION OF SEvERAL ESSAYS, TRACTS, AND
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT 1-40 (P. Thompson comp. 1826) [hereinafter
DISCOURSE].

52. The Law as it Should Be, The Globe & Emerald [1825]. This review of Sampson's
Discourse is reprinted in Pishey Thompson's 1826 compilation of Sampson's essays and
correspondence.
53. Sampson's jurisprudential forays appeared in such periodicals as the Atlantic
Magazine and the New York National Advocate. Many of these were also reprinted in
Pishey Thompson's 1826 compilation.
54. Letter from Peter S. Du Ponceau to William Sampson (June 26, 1827) (Library
of Congress, Manuscript Div., Sampson Papers MS 79-1806).
55. 2 D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 691 (London & Baltimore 1836 &
photo. reprint 1972).
r-A A
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learning. 56
With similar trepidation, James Kent privately recorded that Sampson's "notions of law and Government were utopian, & wild, &
57
radical."
A half-century later, Charles P. Daly was equally measured in his
admiration. Daly dismissed Sampson's Discourse as "the production
of a fluent rhetorical writer, denouncing the common law as a system wholly unsuited to our republican government, ignoring or
probably ignorant of how much we are indebted to it for our free
institutions."58 But even Daly had to allow that the general effect of
Sampson's agitation "was to bring the common law into great disrepute." 59 More recently, Charles M. Cook described the Discourse as
"[o]ne of the strongest, and certainly the most influential, indictments of the received law." 60 Maxwell Bloomfield termed it "the
most devastating critique of common law idealism ever written in
America." 61 Morton Horwitz hails Sampson as "something of a patron saint" among the antebellum civilians, 62 while Robert Cover
noted that Sampson's works "were reprinted and his doctrines endorsed by Livingston in Louisiana, by Grimke in South Carolina, by
Field some years later in New York, [and] by Rantoul in
Massachusetts."

63

Yet we nowadays fail to appreciate the deeply subversive implications of this distinctly American assault on the dominant common
law ideology. Daniel Boorstin, for example, himself an uncompromising critic of Blackstone, overlooks the attack altogether when he
mistakenly claims that "[a] striking feature of our history is how few
examples we offer of individuals or communities embracing a radically instrumental theory of law." 64 Lacking any Bentham, Boorstin
maintains that "[i]n this New World, where men have so often
boasted of their opportunity to make a New Beginning, movements
to codify or new-fashion laws have made surprisingly little headway.
56. Id.
57. Handwritten necrology in book from Kent's library, quoted in M. BLOOMFIELD,
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SocImT, 1776-1876, at 71 (1976).
58. C. DALY, THE COMMON LAW 52 (1894).
59. Id at 54.
60. C. CooK, supra note 47, at 58.
61. Bloomfield, William Sampson and the Codification Movement, in M. BLOOMFIELD,
supra note 57, at 75.
62. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 26, at 60.
63. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141
(1975).
64. D. Boorstin, The Perils of Indwelling Law, in THE DECLINE OF RADICALISM: REFLEcTIONS ON AMERICA TODAY 85 (1969).

1inI"I

In the early nineteenth century, which was an age of codes and radical legislation in Western Europe," he says, "we were making constitutions and elaborating an American common law." 65 Roscoe
Pound did little better. In his famous essay on The Formative Era of
American Law, 6 6 Pound marginalized the indigenous codification
movement and unthinkingly tied it to an assumed Benthamite influence. The historical writings of Perry Miller, 6 7 Charles Cook, 68 and
Maxwell Bloomfield 69 are rare in registering the force of the antebellum assault on the common law. Now, so as to explore more
thoroughly Unger's claim that the critical legal studies movement
has transformed the received critique of formalism and objectivism,
I compare his work with that of Sampson, the banished Irish civil
70
rights lawyer and political agitator.
C. From Sampson to Unger: The Received Critique Transformed?
1.

The Critique of Objectivism

At the heart of Unger's attack on objectivism is his emphasis on
the contingency of schemes of social organization, a notion he illustrates by contrasting the American revolutionaries' choice of a democratic republic and a market system with the alternative model of
an aristocratic, corporatist, old-European system. "The critique of
objectivism that we have undertaken," he explains, "is essentially
the critique of the idea of types of social organization with a built-in
legal structure and of the more subtle but still powerful successors
of this idea in current conceptions of substantive law and doctrine."' 7 1 Both legal-historical and legal-doctrinal analyses have revealed the falsehood of the original idea of "the universal legal
language of the democracy and the market."' 72 In Unger's view, historical study of contract, property, and constitutional theory has
repeatedly led to the discovery of indeterminacy through generalization. Seemingly harmless and even toadying jurists have found to
their disappointment that abstract institutional categories, like democracy or the market, suggest clashing legal principles. Conversely, a doctrinal analysis of the current content of public and
private law exposes competing versions of democracy and the market. Thus, says Unger, these two modes of attack upon objectivism
converge to "discredit, once and for all, the conception of a system
of social types with a built-in institutional structure. 7 3 Unger refers
to this enterprise as "the way we have redefined the attack upon
65. Id. at 168-69. For his attack on Blackstone, see D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS
SCIENCE OF THE LAw (1941).

66.
67.
68.
69.

R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw 153 (1938).
See generally P. MILLER, supra note 50.
See generally C. CooK, supra note 47.
See generally M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 57.
70. For discussions of Sampson's adventurous life, see id. at 59-90; O'Higgins, William Sampson (1764-1836), 2 DUBLIN U.L. REV. 45 [1971].

71. Unger, supra note 4, at 568.
72. Id.
73. Id at 570.
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objectivism." 7 4
As Unger notes, the attack upon objectivism did begin long
before the critical legal studies movement came onto the scene. In
his work, Sampson dismissed the belief that the authoritative legal
materials displayed an intelligible moral order. Like his contemporary Bentham, Sampson flatly denied the notion that the legal
materials making up the English common law-the basis of Blackstone's Commentaries-embodied and sustained a defensible scheme
of human association. Quite the contrary, Sampson castigated "the
antisocial spirit of the common law" in no uncertain terms7 5
As early as 1794, in the years leading up to the unsuccessful rebellion that led to his banishment from Ireland, Sampson perceived the
legitimating effect of law: "I believe that MAGNA CARTA, BILL OF
RIGHTS, and HABEAS CORPUS, are of great use to amuse the
multitude; And I believe, that 'Rule Brittania,' and 'The Sovereigns
of the Sea,' are exquisite Songs for the same purpose." 7 6 In the
same political satire, Sampson declared that "in the fictions of the
' 77
law, is contained all the Equity of the law."
In 1823 Sampson lamented that Blackstone's Commentaries are still
"the only clue whereby to tread the mazy labyrinth through which
[aspiring lawyers] have to pass; and the fascinating eloquence of that
author, conceals a thousand sophistries, dangerous to the principles
which every citizen of our free republic ought, and every professor
of our laws is sworn, to maintain." 7 8 Had Blackstone witnessed "the
wonderful effects of true liberty upon human prosperity and happiness: how a people without hierarchy, nobility, monarchy, distinction of condition, rank, or privilege, can govern themselves," he
would hardly have extolled the "decayed and vicious institutions"
that he did.7 9 Invoking "the spirits of departed fools," which was
the nature of common law reasoning, had become even more indefensible after "[t]he revolution which changed the entire form of
government, from monarchy, the soul of common law, to a republic,
which was a stranger to it."80 Sampson expressed his relief that the
American revolutionaries had "dared to uproot the three great pillars of the Common Law, the monarchy, the hierarchy, and privileged orders" despite his disappointment that they had left standing
the common law itself.$i
74. Id at 567.
75.

DISCOURSE,

supra note 51, at 34.

76.

[W. SAMPSON & T. RUSSELL], REVIEW OF THE LION OF OLD ENGLAND; OR THE
DEMOCRACY CONFOUNDED... 48-49 (Belfast 1794) [hereinafter LION OF OLD ENGLAND].

77. Id.
78. DISCOURSE, supra note 51, at 6.
79. Id at 7.
80. TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS, supra note 49, at 45, 124.
81. DISCOURSE, supra note 51, at 37.
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Sampson launched this attack in his defense of striking shoemakers charged with a common law conspiracy to raise their wages. The
cordwainers had organized into a union, allegedly to resist an existing combination of masters for the express purpose of lowering
the wages of the workers. In 1805 they adopted a constitution
based upon a closed shop. More than once they threatened strikes
against masters who employed journeymen or apprentices in defiance of union rules. In 1809 a dispute with one shop, Corwin &
Aimes, escalated into a general strike after the shoemakers discovered that other masters were taking in the blocked work. At the instigation of the employers, twenty-four strikers were prosecuted in
one of the earliest American labor conspiracy8 2charges and one of
the first to test the legality of the dosed shop.
Sampson argued vigorously that the English common law giving
rise to the prosecution should be disregarded because it was based
on a social order that was morally and politically unacceptable in a
democratic republic. "[T]he English code and constitution are built
upon the inequality of condition in the inhabitants," Sampson reminded the American court.8 3 "Here all are in one degree, that of
citizens; and all equal in their rights. There are many laws in England which can only be executed upon those not favoured by fortune with certain privileges; some operating entirely against the
poor."8 4 To import unjust common law rules into America would
be at war with the very idea of a republic. "There one man is sovereign, and all others his subjects," he pointed out.8 5 "Here no man
is subject, and no man lord or master."8' 6 To allow the prosecution
to proceed would provide employers with a legal method to ensure
that the most useful class of workers "grows poor as its oppressors
7
grow rich." 8
2.

The Critique of Formalism

As for the critique of formalism, Unger maintains that the critical
legal studies movement has approached it from an angle "equally
specific." 8 8 In order to distinguish legal doctrine from political ideology, he argues, formalism requires the existence of some common
guiding vision that informs the practice of legal reasoning. "To determine which part of established opinion about the meaning and
applicability of legal rules you should reject," continues Unger,
"you need a background prescriptive theory of the relevant area of
social practice, a theory that does for the branch of law in question
what a doctrine of the republic or of the political process does for
82. The best general discussion is M. TURNER, THE EARLY AMERICAN LABOR CONSPIRACY CASES: THEIR PLACE IN LABOR LAw (1967).
83. TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS, supra note 49, at 11.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 13.

88. Unger, supra note 4, at 570-71.
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constitutional argument. '8 9 This requirement is fatal to the ideal of
formalism because, no matter what the content of the background
theory, it is unlikely to prove compatible with a broad range of the
received understandings. It will be impossible to support the entire
body of established opinion about the meaning and applicability of
legal rules. Thus, doctrine and ideology merge. The implication of
the critical attack upon formalism "is to demonstrate that a doctrinal
practice that puts its hope in the contrast of legal reasoning to ideology, philosophy, and political prophecy ends up as a collection of
makeshift apologies." 90
Unger claims that the problems with formalism remained a secret
until the gradual collapse of the nineteenth century objectivist attempt to reveal the inherent content of a type of social organization.
Only then did "the permanent disequilibrium of doctrine become
manifest little by little."9 1 But closer study of the received critique
reveals that the attack on formalism began much earlier. Indeed,
even more so than the attack on objectivism, the indeterminacy of
doctrine was one of the most frequent radical complaints against the
common law legal system from the beginning of the last century and
even earlier.
Again, let us take Sampson's assault upon formalism. As with his
critique of objectivism, Sampson's attack on formalism began as
early as 1794. In his Lion of Old England, with typical irony, he
extolled
that bountiful redundancy of English common law, which has been
so happily preserved, and daily encreasing, so as to contain at this
day, together with the statute law, the accumulated mysteries of
near one thousand years! The brief and incomplete index to
which, is of itself enough for the loading of a cart! And this is the
perfection of reason! And as every individual is said to carry public records, and acts of parliament
in his breast, how wise and great
92
a Nation must this be!!
Sampson was distinctly unimpressed by Blackstone's effort to portray the chaos of the common law as rational order.
Later, in his defense of the journeymen cordwainers in 1809, one
of Sampson's main objects was to discredit the internal processes of
the common law that could give rise to a prosecution against workers for a conspiracy to raise their wages. Sampson illustrated his
89. IdL at 571.
90. Id at 573.
91. Id at 574.
92. LION OF OLD ENGLAND, supra note 76, at 43; see also id. at 18, 37, 40-43, 45, 4755, 71-73, 77, 80.
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argument by frequent reference to the common law's more monstrous if antiquated absurdities. 93 The result was a classic attack on
the formalism assailed by Unger. "When Blackstone employs his
eloquent pen to whiten sepulchres, and varnish such incongruities,"
said Sampson, "it is like the knight of La Mancha extolling the
beauty and graces of his broad back'd mistress winnowing her wheat
or riding upon her ass."' 94 Sampson had had enough. "How long
shall this superstitious idolatry endure?" he demanded. 95 "When
shall we be ashamed to gild and varnish this arbitrary gathering of
riddles, paradoxes, and conundrums, with the titles of wisdom and
divinity?" 96
Several years later, when Sampson delivered his Discourse on the
Common Law to the New York Historical Society, he was equally
scathing about Blackstone's attempt to put that system on a rational
footing. "[N]o advocate ever pleaded his cause with more eloquence and grace" than had Blackstone, said Sampson, but yet
he could not make that a science, which was reducible to no fixed
rules, or general principles; and the more he brought it into light,
the more the sunny rays of his bright genius fell upon it; the more
its grotesque forms became defined, the more they
proved to be
97
the wild result of chance and rude convulsions.
Sampson thus exposed the contingent nature of legal rules. He
revealed that in legal controversies, as in any philosophical, ideological, or visionary conflicts, the basic terms of social life are up for
grabs.
3. A Closer Look at Sampson's Critiques of Objectivism and Formalism
and Their Significancefor Unger's Historical Theory
Unger says that once the arguments against objectivism and formalism have been rendered in the "specific ways" he sets out, their
relationship to each other gains "a new and surprising clarity."' 98
He claims that the objectivist project of the nineteenth-century jurists-the search for the built-in institutional structure of the democracy and the market-retained its credibility long enough to
retard the unmasking of formalism. Because the nature and defects
of the objectivist project appeared only gradually, exposure of the
"permanent disequilibrium" of doctrine was equally incremental. 99
The history of modern legal thought, according to Unger, consists
of increasingly desperate and progressively unconvincing attempts
93. For example, Sampson pointed to the barbaric common law custom of trial by
battle, which was not formally abolished until a decade later. Act ofJune 22, 1819, 59
Geo. 3, ch. 46; see TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS, supra note 49, at 38-39, 45,
114-16, 121.
94. TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS, supra note 49, at 43.
95. Id. at 46.
96. Id.
97. DIsCOURSE, supra note 51, at 7.
98. Unger, supra note 4, at 573.
99. Id. at 574.
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to sustain the nineteenth-century illusions of objectivism and formalism-efforts most recently manifested in the emergence of the
law and economics and the rights and principles schools ofjurisprudence. 0 0 But Unger overlooks the radical tradition of legal philosophy that scoffed at any such notions long before law and economics,
rights and principles, or the critical legal studies movement
emerged.
Thus, when Kennedy maintains that the Commentaries artificial categorization of the common law was "an instrument of apology-an
attempt to mystify both dominators and dominated by convincing
them of the 'naturalness,' the 'freedom' and the 'rationality' of a
condition of bondage," 10
' he echoes Sampson's derision of Blackstone as the "professed apologist" of the common law.' 0 2 As we
have seen, Sampson was unpersuaded by Blackstone's effort to portray the English common law as rational-in Ungerian terms he was
anti-formalist. Sampson was equally unimpressed by the scheme of
social division and hierarchy that the common law supported-in
Ungerian terms, he was anti-objectivist.
Specifically, Sampson used at least four major techniques to debunk notions of the naturalness, freedom, or rationality associated
with the common law. First, and for Sampson clearly the most significant, was what Unger terms the "legal-historical" approach.
Sampson mocked Blackstone's reverence for the common law by
pointing to Blackstone's own account of the barbaric origins of that
system. Rather than engaging in an impartial investigation ofjurisprudential history, charged Sampson, Blackstone had uttered nothing but empty rhapsodies upon the antiquity, the purity, and the
pristine vigor of the early common law. He had contented himself
"with certain flights of smooth and specious eloquence, in which he
excels all other writers; and where we most needed light, has left us
most in darkness." 1 0 3 But, Sampson argued, "the true ancestry of
this divine system" was apparent even from the pen of Blackstone
himself-"the most passionate and eloquent eulogist, who had a
4
professor's chair and a salary for praising the common law."' 0
In 1809, in his Trial of the Journeymen Cordwainers, Sampson maintained that the adoption of any common law rule that proscribes "a
combination of men, to regulate their immediate and proper interests" would violate the egalitarian and democratic principles of the
100. Id at 574-76.
101. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries,supra note 28, at 210.
102. DISCOURSE, supra note 51, at 7.
103. Idcat 9.
104. TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN COIiDWAINERS, supra note 49, at 40-4 1.
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modem American republic.1 0 5 Anticipating his Discourse on the Common Law, Sampson characterized the early common law as "a jumble
of rude undigested usages and maxims of successive hordes of semisavages, who, from time to time, invaded and prostrated each
other."' 0 6 He warned against the "unsubstantial spectre of the
common law" that the prosecution sought to raise from the grave
10 7
"in all its grotesque and uncouth deformity."'
In 1823, in his Discourse on the Common Law, Sampson developed
his legal-historical attack at greater length. Having adopted the
common law of England, so far as it was not repugnant to the American constitutions, Sampson urged that "we have a mighty interest
to know clearly what it is, and from what stock it comes." 1 0 8 That
stock-being nothing but the product of barbarians who had "successively invaded, plundered, exterminated, or enslaved each other,
in the long ages of night and darkness"-was horribly polluted. 10 9
By tracing the history of each murderous horde whose barbaric customs had contributed to the common law, Sampson ridiculed Blackstone's superstitious reverence for the law. Blackstone, Sampson
recalled, had found it impossible to speak "[o]f this constitution, so
wisely contrived, so strongly raised, and so highly finished" with
that praise which was so justly and severely its due. 1 10
Sampson characterized our first legal ancestors, the ancient
Britons, as "very barbarous," being given to superstitious idolatry
and human sacrifice.III The Britons were followed by the Romans,
"in every stage of their existence, a cruel and pitiless race," whose
brutality and inhumanity were exemplified by their dependence on
slavery.'12 After the Romans came the early Christians, whose first
taste of royal favor, wealth, security and power prompted them to
affect pomp and adopt pagan ceremonies because they knew no.
others. 1 1 The wealth accumulated by the Christians was a very
tempting prey to their Saxon successors, "fierce pirates" who sometimes quarreled with and mutinied against their numerous gods,
shooting up arrows at them, if not to wound the deities, at least to
prove their own mortal bravery.1 4 The next invaders were the Vikings, "a new set of pirates, more fierce and cruel than our Saxon
ancestors themselves."' 1 5 Then came the Normans, whose feudal
domination was "utterly inconsistent with any advanced state of civilization."11 6 It was these superstitious, cruel and ignorant ancestors
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id. at 38.
107. Id at 31.
108. DISCOURSE, supra note 51, at 32.
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111.
112.
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114.
115.
116.
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Id. (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *435-36).
Id at 15.
Id at 18.
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who had laid the true foundations of the common law that Black117
stone so keenly rhapsodized.
Sampson's second technique for discrediting the English common
law was to expose the unrepresentative nature of thejudiciary. This
point was of particular importance, because common law judges
possessed unlimited power. That power was subject to systemic
abuse, especially in situations of fundamental social conflict, such as
that presented by the striking cordwainers. According to Sampson,
"[t]he hardship, for instance, of malkingjustices, who never laboured,
the judges of the poor man's labour, its intensity and its remuneration is not equitable. [The workers] are not, in that respect, treated
8
as free agents; they are not judged by their peers.""1
For similar reasons, Sampson argued that his adversaries' views
on the right to strike were entitled to little credence. "If it be said,"
declared Sampson, that the journeymen cordwainers
have wages enough, or too much already, I do not think any man a
good witness to that point but one who has himself laboured. If
either of the gentlemen opposed to us will take his station in the
garret or cellar of one of these industrious men, get a leather
apron and a strap, a lap-stone and a hammer, and peg and stitch
from five in the morning till eight in the evening, and feed and
educate his family with what he so earns, then if he will come into
court, and say upon his corporal oath that he was, during that probation, too much pampered or indulged, I will consider whether
these men may not be extortioners.1 1 9
Oddly enough, Sampson's adversaries included his friend, fellow
banished United Irishman, and fellow Jeffersonian Republican,
Thomas Addis Emmet. Some of the defendant strikers were also
Irish exiles.
117. Sampson's attack is significant in that it runs counter to Morton Horwitz's generalization that it was not until the 1920s and 1930s that "legal history performed an

essentially destabilizing and subversive function." Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of
the Role of History, 90 YALE. LJ. 1057, 1058 (1981); see also Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship,90 YALE LJ. 1017, 1024 (1981) ("In the past, legal history has on the whole
served to bolster and reassure existing enterprises of legal scholarship .... "); Horwitz,
The Conservative Traditionin the Writing ofAmerican Legal History, 17 AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 275,
276, 281 (1973) ("The main thrust of lawyer's legal history ... is to pervert the real
function of history by reducing it to the pathetic role of justifying the world as it is.").
118. TRIAL OF THEJOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS, supra note 49, at 24. Sampson warned
that English justices (arguing in an American courtroom, Sampson was careful to limit
the charge)
will be too apt to scorn a leather apron. It is not with their back to the fire,
and their belly to the table, that they can perceive the poor man's wants.
When they have eat their capon, and swallowed their sack, with their reins
well warmed, and then turn round to take their nap, with their backs to the
table and their belly to the fire, they are not the better qualified to judge the
poor man's case.
Id .
119. Id. at 47.
I f n i%111

Sampson's recognition of the role of class conflict in the judicial
system had begun during his defense of sedition trials in the turbulent years leading up to the Irish rebellion of 1798. Himself a child
of the ascendancy in Ireland's deeply fractured eighteenth century
society, Sampson recalled that
the Catholics, now ground into dust, deprived of education and
property, and every means of acquiring either, became null in
their native country. They had no part in the framing or execution of the laws, being excluded from the parliament and the
bench, and from juries, and from the bar. Their only duty was to
bear with patience the penalties inflicted on them, and be spectators of the ludicrous, though interested, quarrels of their oppressors. When any question under the penal laws was tried against
them, it was by a Protestant judge, a Protestant jury; and as they
had a Protestant prosecutor, so they must have a Protestant advocate. What justice they could look for, Heaven knows; they were
shut out from all corporations and offices and every privilege belonging to freemen.... [I]n short, they were humbled below the
120
beasts of the field.
Sampson later recorded that as the political tension mounted in
early 1797, "[t]he trials were preluded by torture, houseburning,
massacre, and every species of terror that could intimidate and appal prisoners, jurors, witnesses, agents, and counsel."1 2 1 The trials
themselves were no better: "the robe still showed the judge, and
the bayonet the soldier; but like Kirk and Jeffreys they marched
1 22
hand in hand making their unhallowed rounds together."
In one of his satirical attacks upon the English government and its
role in Ireland, Sampson had made particular reference to the narrow class from which those who enacted and enforced the law were
drawn. The Lion of Old England, an allegorical tyrant, professed a
creed in which he declared his belief "that Lords are by birth judges,
Legislators, and Counsellors." 1 23 Sampson depicted Justice holding
1 24
a scales with which to weigh the purses of the contending parties.
Sampson was reluctant, however, to ascribe deliberately sinister
motives to those who administered the law. Referring to the legal
repression of the mostly Gaelic-speaking Catholics by the Irishjudiciary-for opposing which he had been first imprisoned, then disbarred, and then banished-Sampson explained that "[t]he system
under which they acted; the barbarous code with which they were
familiar, was enough to taint their judgment. No judge, no legislator, historian, poet or philosopher, but what has been tinctured,
with the follies or superstitions of his age."1 25 Before submitting to
120. W. SAMPSON, MEMOIRS OF WILLIAM SAMPSON, AN IRISH EXILE; WRITTEN BY HIMSELF ...
252 (London 1832) [hereinafter MEMOIRS].
121. W. Sampson, Preface to W. CURRAN, THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN
PHILPOT CURRAN, LATE MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN IRELAND XX (New York 1820).

122. Id
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human authority under the common law, Sampson warned us to reflect on "how few in any age have risen above the superstitions of
their day, and how few of those have chosen to encounter the cur26
rent of power, interest or fashion."'
In his third line of attack upon objectivism and formalism, Sampson, like Unger, 127 insisted upon an empirical foundation for rules
of law. Sampson based his defense of the journeymen cordwainers
not only on the democratic and egalitarian principles at stake, but
also on an appeal to economic reality. Citing "the profound and
perspicacious Adam Smith," Sampson claimed that "the master
tradesmen are in permanent conspiracy against the workmen; so
much so that it passes unobserved as the natural course of things,
which challenges no attention."' 28 Far from the striking shoemakers being guilty of any conspiracy, it was the "sleek and pampered
masters"' 12 9 who regularly "enter[ed] without fear into a sordid
combination to oppress the journeymen."' 3 0 It was not an even
struggle. Sampson was unable to see how a solitary poor workman
could resist a wealthy and powerful combination of masters. "Must
they be scattered like the sheaf of rods," he asked, "to be more easily broken?"' 3 1
Why call in the law to make artificial regulations rather than let
the thing naturally regulate itself? "Muzzle but these prosecutions,
and then, before we have gone long slipshod, the masters and the
men will have come to an agreement, founded, like all bargains, on
reciprocal need; the one giving as little as he can give, and the other
taking as much as he can get."' 3 2 The workers' right to organize
should not be fettered by law. Indeed, even then, "[i]f all the masters were on one side, and all the workmen on the other, the contest
3 3 It
must soon end sufficiently to the advantage of the employers."
was burlesque to charge an indictable conspiracy because a "scab"
having sought to better himself at the expense of his fellow workers
while they negotiated terms, the remainder "show[ed] their displeasure . . .by shaking the dust off their feet, and leaving the shop
where he is engaged."' 1 4 In short, the prosecution of workers for a
64 (New York 1813 & photo. reprint 1974). In this case, incidentally,
Sampson successfully argued for the first free exercise exemption in American constitutional law. See McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1409-10, 1503-05 (1990).
126. DIsCOURSE, supra note 51, at 10.
127. Unger, supra note 4, at 577-78.
128. TRIAL OF THEJOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS, supra note 49, at 12.
129. Id. at 26.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Id. at 34.
132. Id. at 36-37.
133. Id. at 67.
134. Id. at 68.
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conspiracy to raise their wages was an "unnatural effort to sustain
monopoly on pretence of putting down monopoly." 13 5 Much earlier, vainly hoping to avert a bloody rebellion in Ireland by persuading the aristocracy to change their foolish ways, in his Advice to the
Rich Sampson had challenged them either to reform the laws or else
to prove "by fact and experiment" rather than "idle rhapsodies"
36
that the constitution tended to promote public happiness.'
Sampson's fourth major technique for attacking the stability of
the common law was an appeal to the American judiciary to assert
the independence of their legal system and to model it on egalitarian and democratic principles. Too often had American courts, he
claimed, been led into error by reliance upon foreign law books
without "considering how unsuitable these foreign laws may be to
our condition."' 3 7 Such servile adherence could only impede the
advance of American commerce, arts, industry, science and philosophy, and was destined to deny freedom and prosperity to its citizens.
By breaking from the crown, the revolutionaries had seized the opportunity to create a radically new society based on republican and
democratic economic and political principles. But this ideal was
threatened because Americans had fallen into "the habit of borrowing the fashions of our thoughts like those of our dress, from a foreign nation."' 3 8 The common law was one vestige of colonialism
that undercut the whole notion of American independence. "[I]t is
time we should assert our own independent judgment, and act and
think for ourselves," he insisted. 3 9 Americans should stop importing English decisions, because English judges "are not fit persons to
40
legislate for us.'
These various considerations converged to expose the law as a
chosen structure of vital social importance. Like his contemporary
Jeremy Bentham and successors David Dudley Field, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, the legal realists, and now the critical legal studies movement, Sampson saw the law's mystification as not only senseless, but
also dangerous. He remarked that the law was viewed "as though its
spirit were all disingenuous mystery, its language a barbarous
jargon."' 14 1 But "[tihe well-being of society requires that a subject
of such vital importance, should be brought to the test of reason in
the open light of day. The law of a free people should never be a
matter of indifference."' 4 2 Sampson suggested that posterity would
wonder why the Americans, long after they had set the great example of self-government upon principles of perfect equality still revered that "one pagan idol"-the common law-"to which they
135. Id at 113.
136. [W. SAMPSON], AN ADVICE TO THE RICH BY AN INDEPENDANT COUNTRY GENTLEMAN, POINTING OUT THE ROAD TO SECURITY AN[D] PEACE 28-35 (Dublin 1796) [hereinafter ADVICE TO THE RICH].
137. TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS, supra note 49, at 11.
138. Id. at 35.
139. DISCOURSE, supra note 51, at 10.
140. Id. at 34-35.
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daily offered up much smoky incense."' 43 By "lay[ing] aside the veil
of mystery," and by exposing the common law "as a human, not a
preternatural institution," predicted Sampson, "[ilts stubborn
forms will be taught to bend to the convenience and exigencies of
the People for whose use it subsists."' 1 In America, he said, "the
People know that their law is the creature of their power; the work
of their own hands; and that, if it is not good, it is to their own

shame." 145
Sampson's instrumentalist insight was shared by many of his contemporaries. 146 It was echoed in strikingly similar terms by Holmes,
who urged that legal rules be measured against social ends and who
found it "revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."147 Worse still for

Holmes was when the grounds upon which the rule was laid down
had vanished long since and it persisted simply "from blind imitation of the past."' 48 The same insight was at the core of the jurisprudence developed by the legal realists. 149 All of these thinkers
arrived on the scene long before the critical legal studies movement.
So, what's new? The Ungerian critique of formalism, we recall,
relies on the clash of legal rules against a frequently incompatible
background prescriptive theory of the relevant social practice. This
critique may differ in method, but it does not differ in result from
that of Sampson, who pointed to the incongruity of resting legal
rules upon the customs of dead barbarians rather than the process
of reason. Unger's critique of formalism is one way of restating the
earlier critique advanced by Sampson.
More puzzling is the particular critique of objectivism that Unger
attributes to the critical legal studies movement-"essentially the
critique of the idea of types of social organization with a built-in
legal structure and of the more subtle but still powerful successors
of this idea in current conceptions of substantive law and doctrine."' 150 How does this critique relate to Sampson's attack on objectivism? Without clarification, Unger asserts that historical study
143. Id at 11.

144. Id at 6.
145. id at 10.
146. See generally C. COOK, supra note 47, at 97-106.
147. Holmes, supra note 35, at 469.
148. Id
149. See, e.g., Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 844-45 (1935). See generally R.S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY 136-59 (1982) (discussing attacks on formalism and the rise of intrumentalism); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HAtv. L. REv. 1669 & n.22 (1982) (mistakenly crediting Holmes-who is
often heralded as the first legal realist-with being the earliest to articulate the insight
that "the components of current legal doctrine exist as a result of historical circumstance rather than legal necessity").
150. Unger, supra note 4, at 568.

has "repeatedly shown" the falsehood of the original idea underlying "every attempt to find the universal legal language of the democracy and the market." 1'5 But universal language is an elusive
quarry and it is doubtful that any thinker actually pursued it. In any
event, the hunt called off by Sampson was a different one. By
stressing law as a human institution rather than a divine one, Sampson and other authors of the received critique of objectivism-in
Ungerian terms the belief that the authoritative legal materials display an intelligible moral order-did not attack an abstract notion of
some universal legal language of democracy or the marketplace.
Rather, they undermined the claims to legitimacy of the actual legal
language of the democracy or marketplace in which they were currently situated.
In any event, contrary to Unger's implicit assertion, the nature
and defects of the objectivist project were apparent to its early critics like Sampson; the exposure of that project was not gradual; and
the objectivist project did not retain sufficient credibility in Sampson's eyes to conceal the permanent disequilibrium of doctrine. In
other words, however much Unger's critiques of objectivism and
formalism may be justified, they do not transform the received critique and redefine the meaning of radicalism. They merely restate
the radical dilemma.
II.

The Rule of Law and the Radical Dilemma

Having overcome the notion of law as immanent moral rationality, Unger peers over the edge of the abyss. He recognizes that just
as the rule of law can establish and perpetuate hierarchies, so too it
can subvert and destroy them. Hider needed the violence of law to
legitimate the rule of Naziism. In Nuremberg only a few years later,
Hitler's enemies needed the rule of law to destroy the violence of
Naziism. So, too, by challenging the rule of law in eighteenth-century revolutionary Ireland, Sampson sought to uphold the rule of
law in eighteenth-century revolutionary Ireland.
Unger needs the bridge of legal doctrine if he is to cross the void
that separates anarchy from order and might from right. Unger
knows how deep and wide is the abyss: "It may fairly be asked why
radicals should be interested in preserving doctrine at all," he acknowledges. 5 2 "At stake in the defense of a suitably expanded doctrinal practice is the validity of normative and programmatic
argument itself ... ,"153 Unger perceives that "carried to the extreme, the critique of objectivism and formalism would leave nothing standing. The very possibility of legal doctrine, and perhaps
even of normative argument generally, might be destroyed."' 154 In
these passages of Unger's manifesto of the critical legal studies
movement lies buried a plaintive articulation of the dilemma that
151.
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has troubled radical critics at least since Sampson's time. Sampson
tried to escape the radical dilemma through codification. Unger
tries through deviationist doctrine.
A.

From Critique to Construction: Codification and DeviationistDoctrine

Sampson was confronted with the radical dilemma almost two
centuries ago. At first he blithely ignored it. In the early years of his
practice as a United Irish defense lawyer and his political activity as
a radical pamphleteer, Sampson viewed the palpable injustice of the
eighteenth-century Irish legal system as the product of a corrupt administration rather than as a structural consequence of the common
law tradition. In 1797, writing under the pen name Fortesque in the
radical newspaper The Press, Sampson lamented that the common
law had been diverted from its proper course by a despotic government determined to deprive the people of their freedom.' 55 With
the same energy that characterized his later thinking, Sampson attacked the judicial turpitude of "those monsters, in pol[l]uted ermine" who had pronounced cruel punishments at the whim of a
monarch throughout the history of the common law.' 5 6 Following
the American revolutionaries, Sampson believed then that such reforms as an independent judiciary in Ireland would restore "those
great out-works which fortify the liberties of my country, common law
principles," and thereby ensure the "free course ofjustice."' 5 7 It was
not the system that was to blame, or so he felt then. Rather, it was
those who abused it. Convincing Sampson that the common law
system was itself a central part of the problem took a tragic rebellion
in 1798, observation of the introduction of the Napoleonic Code in
1804 during his exile in France, and eventual refuge in the relative
freedom and equality of America.
By the time Sampson defended the journeymen cordwainers in
New York in 1809, he regarded the common law as politically unacceptable and a systemic cause of injustice. Sampson's resolution of
the radical dilemma-recognition of the rule of law as a powerful
weapon of subversive, normative social transformation, not merely
as an instrument of oppression-was codification. It was in the
course of this trial that Sampson first called for the adoption of a
155. Fortescue, To the Printerof the Press, The Press, Sept. 30, 1797, and Fortescue, To
the Pinter of the Press, The Press, Nov. 7, 1797, reprinted in EXTRACTS FROM The Press: A
NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED IN THE CAPITAL OF IRELAND, DURING PART OF THE YEARS 1797 AND
1798;

INCLUDING NUMBERS SIXTY-EIGHT AND SIXTY-NINE, WHICH WERE SUPPRESSED BY

ORDER OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE USUAL TIME OF PUBLICATION
(Philadelphia 1804) [hereinafter EXTRACTS].

120, 145

156. Fortescue, To the Printer of the Press, The Press, Sept. 30, 1797, reprinted in ExTRACTS, supra note 155, at 122.
157. Id at 121.
10011

code in place of customary law. He claimed that the striking shoemakers' prosecution for the common law crime of a conspiracy to
raise their wages was utterly inconsistent with the democratic principles upon which the new republic was based. "The more I reflect
upon the advantages this nation has gained by independence," he
declared, "the more I regret that one thing should still be wanting
to crown the noble arch-A NATIONAL CODE." 158 By virtue of
the American revolution, in Sampson's eyes, "[a] nation was rescued
from colonial dependence; her citizens from prerogative, monopoly,
and privilege; religion purged from intolerance; and a constitution
was founded on the sacred rights of man." 15 9 Sadly, however, the
revolutionaries had failed to abolish the common law. It was up to
160
posterity, he asserted, to carry out their desires.
Sampson drove his point home several years later when he was
invited to address the New York Historical Society. According to
Sampson, the choice was a simple one. "We must either be governed by laws made for us, or made by us." 16 1 He urged Americans

to adopt "a judicial code, substituted in the place of antiquated legends, usages, and customs."

16 2

If the revolutionaries of 1776 had

"dared to uproot the three great pillars of the Common Law, the
monarchy, the hierarchy, and privileged orders, shall we stand in
63
superstitious awe of unlaid spectres?"'
Sampson sought to reassure those who were alarmed at such an
ambitious project. In reducing the common law to a body of written
reason, it would be necessary only to resort to "mature wisdom,
64
where many ideas are referred to few and general principles."
Sampson promised the hesitant that much existing law would be incorporated into the new system. "[A]s to our laws, it is one thing to
change, and another to reform them with a tender, patient, kindly,
and experienced hand ... ."165 The common law contained,
"amidst a world of rubbish, rich treasures of experience," which
166
would require little more than regulation and systematic order.
By the legislature ordering, fixing principles to govern the law, settling doubts that plagued it, abolishing procedures that impeded
justice and establishing those that promoted it, and translating statutes into plain and intelligible language, the codification would be
complete. Once the task was done, Sampson argued, "[p]articular
cases will not then be resorted to, instead of general law. The law
will govern the decisions of judges, and not the decisions the
7
law."1

6

Sampson's heretic zeal was generated by his close observation of
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the codification experiment during his exile in France, following
hard on the heels of his exposure to an Irish judiciary whose interests were directly at odds with those of the masses. But Sampson
had long sought a solution to the radical dilemma. In 1825, after
the success of his Discourse on the Common Law, Sampson wrote to
another banished Irish rebel that codification was a "subject on
which I have meditated since I first became a lawyer; but the occasion for promulgating such opinions was never ripe till now." 168 Indeed, the intellectual foundations of Sampson's attack on the
common law were embedded in the democratic principles he had
proclaimed thirty years previously in the pages of the Northern Star,
the radical newspaper in which he had first published such early
pieces as The Trial of Hurdy Gurdy and the Lion of Old England, and
which was suppressed shortly before the Irish rebellion of 1798.
Just as Sampson confronted the radical dilemma two centuries
ago, Unger faces it now. Remember that Unger rues the fact that
both tendencies of the critical legal studies movement shy away
from "prescriptive and programmatic thought."' 69 Remember also
that Unger answered his own question why radicals should be interested in preserving doctrine at all by retorting that "[a]t stake in the
defense of a suitably expanded doctrinal practice is the validity of
normative and programmatic argument itself."' 7 0 Now, searching
for a constructive outcome to his critique of formalism, for some
remaining possibility of valid normative and programmatic discourse, Unger finds deviationist doctrine.
In place of formalism, the "radicals" for whom Unger speaks believe that "the class of legitimate doctrinal activities must be sharply
enlarged."'17 1 The received style of doctrine should be regarded as
arbitrarily restricted. But Unger is vague as to where the limits of
doctrine lie:
We agree neither on whether this expanded or deviationist doctrine can in fact be constructed nor on what exactly its methods
and boundaries should be. But we know that only such an expansion could generate a conceptual practice that maintains the minimal characteristics of doctrine-the willingness to take the extant
authoritative materials as starting points and the claim to normative authority-while avoiding the arbitrary juxtaposition of easy
analogy and truncated theorizing that characterizes the17most
am2
bitious and coherent examples of legal analysis today.
168. Letter from William Sampson to David Baillie Warden (Apr. 27, 1825) (Maryland Historical Society, David Baillie Warden Papers). For the critical reaction to Sampson's DISCOURSE, see supra text accompanying notes 51-63, and C. CooK, supra note 47.
169. Unger, supra note 4, at 563 n.1.
170. Id. at 577.
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Expanded, enlarged, deviationist, or critical doctrine, as it is variously called, does have some identifiable characteristics. Briefly, as
we have seen, it places greater emphasis on empiricism, both in demanding that legal rules should actually serve their intended social
purpose, and in showing that abstract ideals or categories such as
political equality can be exemplified by alternative institutional embodiments. Expanded doctrine also displays a greater willingness to
recognize and develop the disharmonies of the law by finding in
these disharmonies the elements of broader contests among prescriptive conceptions of society. Finally, adds Unger, expanded
doctrine "integrate[s] into standard doctrinal argument the explicit
controversy over the right and feasible structure of society, over
what the relations among people should be like in the different areas
of social activity." 173 In the past, the final level of legal argument
was preempted by implicit reliance on a secular or sacred vision of
the one right and necessary order of social life. Today, society is
understood to be made or imagined rather than merely given. It is
open to transformative conflict. The critical legal studies movement, through its constructive development of expanded doctrine
and over the opposition of modem jurists and their philosophers,
seeks to "transform legal doctrine into one more arena for continuing the fight over the right and possible forms of social life.' 1 74 In
sum, deviationist doctrine "extends into legal thought a social program committed to moderate the contrast between 75routinized social
life and its occasional revolutionary re-creation."'
Unger illustrates the doctrinal aspects of his institutional program
by instances of expanded doctrine at work in two areas-equal protection and freedom of contract. He proposes, for example, in place
of existing equal protection doctrine the recognition of"destabilization rights" that would "oblig[e] government to disrupt those forms
of division and hierarchy that, contrary to the spirit of the constitution, manage to achieve stability only by distancing themselves from
176
the transformative conflicts that might disturb them."'
Destabilization rights would welcome ideological controversy by
ridding legal analysis of the dogmatic assumptions and arbitrary distinctions that shackle current equal protection doctrine. Unger offers a different variant of deviationist doctrine by searching out the
counterprinciples that lurk on the margins of' classical laissez-faire
contract theory. These counterprinciples reflect visions of community and solidarity, suggesting rival doctrinal approaches
that, in
17 7
turn, invite alternative institutional embodiments.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

578.
579.
583.
612.
602-48.

rxVnT

tQ4Ai. A

Redefining Radicalism
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

B.

From Critique to Construction: Visionary Thought

The other constructive product of the critical legal studies movement, says Unger, comes from the critique of objectivism. That critique "turn[s] us toward the search for alternative institutional
forms of the available institutional ideals, most especially the market
and the democracy."' 178 The inspirational ideal of this search
"arises from the generalization of aims more or less shared by the
great secular doctrines of emancipation of the recent past-liberalism, socialism, and communism-and by the social theories that
supported them."' 17 9 Unger states his social ideal in three
equivalent versions. In the first, it is the "cumulative loosening of
the fixed order of society-its plan of social division and hierarchy,
its enacted scheme of the possible and desirable modes of human
association."' 8 0 In the second version, "the life chances and life experiences of the individual should be increasingly freed from the
tyranny of abstract social categories. He should not be the puppet
of his place in the contrast of classes, sexes, and nations."1 81 And in
the third, "the active power to remake and reimagine the structure
of social life should enter into the character of everyday existence."' 8 2 The social ideal also requires a conception of law and its
relation to society. "Law and constitution are now to be seen as just
the reverse of what prerevolutionary theory demanded. They bethe reaffirmation of the plan of social
come the denial rather than
83
division and hierarchy."'

Then, having established the social ideal and the relation of law to
society, Unger moves on to propose "a program for the reconstruction of the state and the rest of the large-scale institutional structure
of society."' 814 At the heart of this apparently ambitious "culturalrevolutionary" project is one guiding and unifying aim: "the systematic remaking of all direct personal connections-like those between superiors and subordinates or between men and womenthrough their progressive emancipation from a background plan of
social division and hierarchy."' 1 5 Such a plan represents an established power order that curbs "the opportunities of practical exchange or passionate attachment."' 186 In place of any established
178. Id at 583
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power order, Unger envisages "a state not hostage to a faction, existing in a society freed from a rigid and determinate order of division and hierarchy" supported by "an institutional structure, itself
self-revising, that would provide constant occasions to disrupt any
fixed structure of power and coordination in social life. Any such
emergent structure would be broken up before having a chance to
18 7
shield itself from the risks of ordinary conflict."
Unger sets out his program of institutional reconstruction on
three fronts: the reorganization of government, the reorganization
of the economy, and the redefinition of rights so as to recognize
specific forms of human connection that contribute to a scheme of
collective self-government and resist the influence of social division
and hierarchy. 188 After giving his examples of deviationist doctrine
at work in equal protection and contract theory, 1 89 Unger concludes
his essay by acknowledging the vital role of normative commitment.
At the center of his proposal for the revolutionary transformation of
society is an understanding of society as "made and imagined rather
than as merely given in a self-generating process."' 90 Speaking for
the critical legal studies movement as a whole, Unger announces
that "[w]e have taught ourselves not to see the major governmental
and economic systems that now compete for world mastery as the
exhaustive options among which mankind must choose."' 19 1
Visionary thought is certainly the radical's indispensable tool for
world transformation. Sampson's earliest writings combine that visionary thought with his keen critical faculty. One example is
Sampson's mock report of the Trial of Hurdy Gurdy, 192 which indicted
the oligarchical Irish government for its use of seditious libel prosecutions to suppress political debate. Sampson blamed the judiciary
as an accomplice in this repression. Simultaneously, his satire
loudly proclaimed the democratic and republican principles that
were so subversive in a society built on rank, privilege and
exclusion.
The unfortunate Hurdy Gurdy was a barrel organ charged with
playing a seditious tune by the name of "ga ira."' 9 3 The idea, surprisingly, was drawn from two real events. On March 9, 1793, the
military became incensed upon hearing that "outlandish tune"
which meant the constitution will go. The soldiers turned upon the
Belfast townsfolk and precipitated a riot. 19 4 Shortly afterwards, the
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

591-92.
599.
602-48.
665.
655.

192. W. SAMPSON, A FAITHFUL REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF HURDY GURDY

1794) [hereinafter
193. Id. at 2.

. ..

(Belfast

TRIAL OF HURDY GURDY].
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music of a hurdy gurdy was actually used to convict the Scottish radical, Thomas Muir. 19 5 As events turned out, Hurdy Gurdy's travails
were uncannily similar to those Peter Finerty, the printer of The
Press, would endure a few years later. 196 In addition to articulating
his visionary political thought, Sampson's mock report of the Hurdy
Gurdy trial voices his early critiques of formalism and objectivism.
"Gentlemen," said the fictitious Attorney General to the jury, "it
is impossible for me to explain why it is necessary to describe this
offence in so many different counts or tales. Public convenience requires that the proceedings in our criminal law should not be easily
understood-the sanction of antiquity ratifies it."1 9 7 The Attorney
General described the monstrous threat posed by Hurdy Gurdy's
tunes and implored the exclusively Protestant jury:
[Als you regard the sacred ties of your holy religion, wisely and
justly established by the law.., by a firm and upright verdict, to
check the career of frantic delusion, set on by diabolical malignity,
which if suffered to go one jot further, will burst the bounds of all
legal and social restraint, and overwhelm the British empire, the
glory of the world, in blood and desolation, and envelope in
worse than Egyptian darkness, or Egyptian bondage, you and your
posterity for ever-will reverse the happy order of all thingsoverturn every establishment in every quarter of the globe-plant
the tree of liberty in Muscovy-fraternize with the Hottentot-enlighten the Mussulmen--create Atheists in Ethiopia-Republicans
in the Tartarean deserts; and-municipalities in Patagonia!!! 19 8
The government put on the evidence of an informant, French Horn,
who had played with Hurdy Gurdy on numerous occasions. French
Horn's testimony consisted of fragments of popular songs, evidence
which was at best ambiguous. 19 9
Hurdy Gurdy's counsel lamented that the country "had reached
that pitch of political delusion, when to reason was to be condemned, and when it was unsafe to oppose any argument to the preconceived opinions of men." 20 0 The defense saw an "epidemical
fever in the body politic, the symptoms of which were delirium and a
AccouNT

195. AN
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horror of every thing new."' 20 1 Quack prosecutors were quick to
drone into the ears ofjuries "long stupid old songs about Murder,
and France, and United Irishmen, and Rogues, and Raparees, and
Rawhead and Bloodybones, by which they inspire them with immoderate panic, so as to increase the weakness and irritability of
their nerves. ' 20 2 And the juries, instead of turning against the
quacks, "join with them in a loud cry of 'innovation, revolution,
having said this they seem ready to devour their
damnation,' and
20 3
best friends."
In no uncertain terms, a partisan judge told the jury that the tune
played by Hurdy Gurdy tended to promote discord among the people. It was "an indirect and treacherous attempt to stir up the Roman Catholics" of Ireland, he warned, "to excite them to murmur
and to render them discontented with all that the beneficence of
their King and the wisdom and goodness of his Parliament have
done for them." 20 4 The truth of their grievances against the government was no justification for arousing public discontent.
Nor was it necessary that the jury understand the indictment:
it is the nature of our criminal law to be not easily understood,
although infinitely more simple than our civil code ....

Why it

consists of so many counts, or different ways of relating the same
thing, and is yet unintelligible to you, at least in proportion as it is
tedious-and why being on twenty skins of parchment, it is twenty
times more difficult to comprehend, than if it was in one, and a
hundred times more so, than if it was in the hundreth part of one,
20 5
is a mystery which I am glad I am not called upon to explain.
20 6
The jury, obedient to their instructions, duly convicted.
Upon hearing his guilty verdict, Hurdy Gurdy made an unrepentant speech from the dock. He insisted upon the truth of his
own political opinions and the corruption and rottenness of the
state. He believed that "the prosecution commenced against him
was for purposes of revenge and crooked policy, and not ofjustice,
or for the sake of public example." 20 7 Indeed, "if it had been for the
sake ofjustice, he would have been tried speedily, and in the county
where the offence was committed, and would not have been harrassed with an infinite number of informations and charges, and
with such an infinity of senseless counts." 20 8 Although his "persecutors ha[d] made frequent use and repetition of the word constitution, it [was] a phrase which convey[ed] as little meaning to them as
it d[id] to [Hurdy Gurdy]." 20 9 His free soul stood firm against fears
of the pillory, thumbscrews, stocks, imprisonment, and flogging.
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Hurdy Gurdy declared that so long as a peg was left in his barrel, he
would never "change his tunes-but [would] continue to play suchfree
airs as heretofore.., in honor of LIBERTY, and in furtherance of
the RIGHTS OF MAN!"'2 10 Thus, Sampson's gathering critique of
objectivism had already convinced him that the authoritative legal
materials-the discriminatory laws of Ireland in those smoldering
years between the French Revolution and the 1798 rebellion-displayed no defensible moral order. The inspirational ideal of his
search for alternative institutional schemes of human association
sprang directly from the Enlightenment endeavour: the substitution
of individual liberty for assigned social role.
Hence Sampson's almost childlike faith in the unbounded
emancipatory possibilities of human progress. He was born into an
age of declining mysticism, advancing inquiry and criticism, growing
commitment to social reform, and increasing innovation. The
ancien regime was tumbling before Sampson's very eyes, and pulling down with it an enacted plan of social division, of hierarchy, of
constrained modes of human association. The tyranny of abstract
social categories, to borrow Unger's language, appeared to be yielding to a daily rethinking and remaking of the structure of social life.
For Sampson, who was committed to that imaginative restructuring,
codification promised the reverse of common law ideology: it would
deny rather than reaffirm the enacted plan of a divided and hierarchical society.
Sampson's guileless enthusiasm captured the spirit that ignited
the age of revolution. Writing almost simultaneously, but in the
shadow of the guillotine, Condorcet wrote a history marred by centuries of Christian superstition, religious massacres, persistent slavery, pitiless tyranny, and plundering imperialism. The tragic
optimism of Condorcet nevertheless found "the strongest reasons
for believing that nature has put no limit on our expectations"; he
projected an impending epoch in which "the sun will shine only on
free men on this earth, on men who will recognize no master but
their reason." 2 11 Under the influence of reason alone, war would be
abolished, the colonies freed, slaves emancipated, women treated
equally, and barbarous nations civilized. Sampson saw a similar mirage. In 1794 he published his allegorical Lion of Old England, in
which he predicted the collapse of the age when "some Monarch's
210. Id. For Hurdy Gurdy's sentence, Sampson referred the reader to the Lion of Old
England, supra note 76. TRIAL OF HURDY GURDY, supra note 192, at 41 (note that this
direction appears only in the Belfast edition); see also LION OF OLD ENGLAND, supra note
76, at 41, 71-72.
211. MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, EsQUISSE D'UN TABLEAU HISTORIQUE DES PROGRES DE
L'ESPRrr HUMAIN, reprinted in OEUVRES 237-38, 244 (A. Condorcet O'Connor & M.F.
Arago eds. 1847), quoted in P. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 120
(1969).
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cruel command, Spreads desolation thro' th[e] smiling land. '2 12
... [m]ethinks I can descry the day,
When all such vanities shall pass away;
When PEACE shall dwell on earth, and man shall learn,
The majesty of Heaven to discern;
No more shall tremble at a tyrant[']s nod,
Nor pay the homage due to God.
Fantastical authority no more
Forbid the human intellect t'explore
Its sacred springs-No more the infant voice,
Be taught for slaughter'd thousands to rejoice.
No more shall fiend like hosts be led along,
To butcher those who never did them wrong;
And man, forgetful of his nature vie
213
With beasts of prey, in savage cruelty ....
As Sampson viewed events, an imperialist nation was doomed
abroad by a warlike foreign policy and at home by a growing insistence on the rights of man.
III.

Revolutions and Revolutionaries

In order to legitimate itself, every social institution must deny the
ultimate circumstances of its own creation. In its starkest form, this
statement holds true for the state. As Robert Cover has pointed
out, speaking of the American Revolution, "[w]e too often forget
that the leaders of the rebellion had certainly committed treason
from the English constitutional perspective." 21 4 Elsewhere Cover
observed that "[e]very legal order must conceive of itself in one way
or another as emerging out of that which is itself unlawful." 21 5 His
insight reminds us that it is mere circumstance, that quirk of fate, a
thin erratic line uneasily separating victory from defeat, that has us
worship the crimes of some while loathing those of others. Straddling that line on the eve of rebellion, Sampson warned the aristocracy that "it is true policy to abstain from driving a people on to that
giddy verge, where a breath shall determine whether their actions
' 21 6
shall be consecrated as virtuous, or stigmatized as treasonable.
From a less precarious position, SamuelJohnson pondered "why he
that accomplished wickedness should be glorious, and he that only
endeavoured it should be criminal." 2 17 In exile, Sampson wondered "why men set so much value upon ancestry. For as all moralists agree that fraud and violence prevail in this life over gentleness
and virtue, so to say that we had great ancestors, is too often the
21 8
same as to say that we descend from great knaves."
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But the forgotten are never allowed to forget. After 1798, for
their indiscretions, the United Irishmen were banished if they were
lucky and executed if they were not. Some of them, transported to
the penal colonies of New South Wales, unwillingly helped to found
a nation almost as the successful American revolutionaries had
done. 2 19 And neither are the vanquished ever allowed to forget.
This is the history-the distinction between victory and defeat-that
traces the roots of America to holy heroes and those of Australia to
forgotten convicts.
Unger talks much about revolution. In his most recent work he
offers explicit advice to those who would accomplish "the violent
seizure of the state against a background of revolutionary action. ' 220 His adversary, Ewald, while acknowledging that military
strategy and revolutionary subversion "canbe put to good uses as
well as bad," accuses Unger of "scholarly inaccuracy and general
argumentative confusion" that "ignore and absolve mass killing and
cultural destruction. '2 21 This Essay concentrates on political
revolution as opposed to a transformative cultural revolution. It is
22 2
here that we find ourselves on the testing ground of law.
Political revolution is the violent overthrow of the state. It is a
rebellion that worked. Rebellion is an attempt to tear down the very
foundations of the established law. Revolutionaries are frustrated
by what is and moved by an alternative vision of what should be. As
John Locke observed, "there is only one thing which gathers people
into seditious commotions, and that is oppression." 2 23 Similarly,
Sampson queried "[w]hat can be the result of a general persecution
219. R.
220. R.

HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE 181-95 (1988).
UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SER-

VICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY.
THEORY 432 (1987).

PART I OF POLITCs, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL

221. Ewald, supra note 32, at 745, 753. These threatened consequences are the only
reasonable explanation for Ewald's startling pronouncement that "if you are going to
reject the legal system and describe yourself as a philosopher, then your philosophy had
better be up to professional standards." Id at 672. He warns that "if you want to write
about Hobbes or mathematical logic or Aristotle's metaphysics, you would do well to
proceed with a certain degree of care: These are not topics for amateurs." Id One
quakes in fear of having to earn a license to practice legal philosophy, obtain philosophical malpractice insurance, and answer to a disciplinary committee for philosophical incompetence. Ewald's anti-Sampsonian, mystificatory, and elitist intellectual regime
would exclude from participation in its discourse even such influential thinkers as Spinoza, who was a lens grinder, Descartes, who was a mercenary; and Rousseau, who was a
good-for-nothing vagabond.
222. See generally Honore, Reflections on Revolutions, 2 IR.JURIST (n.s.) 268 (1967); Eekelaar, Principlesof Revolutionary Legality, and Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in OxFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 22, 44 (A. Simpson ed. 1973).
223. J. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 54 (P. Romanell ed. 1955) (1st ed.
1689).
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but a general conspiracy?" 2 24 Yet rebellion is seldom if ever a denial of law itself. Typically, revolutionaries appeal to some higher
law, some normative command with which the existing legal structure is incompatible. As Cover has noted, a group that fails to adjust to or accept domination while sharing a physical space must
choose between martyrdom and rebellion. To rebel demands "a
willingness not only to die but also to kill for an understanding of
the normative future that differs from that of the dominating
power." 2 25 Equally, the revolutionary knows that his or her own life
is the price of failure.
Once success transforms rebellion into revolution, it is the hidden
violence of law, the same violent domination that rebellion overcame, that establishes the countervision that fired the revolution. In
place of the old social order, the revolutionary puts a new one, and
it is the new law that forbids and its caged violence that frightens the
vanquished dominators from angrily wresting back the power they
have lost. The violence implicit in law resists change and makes revolutionaries, but it also cements change and makes revolutions.
Without law, there can be neither. We see this at all times and in all
cultures.
A.

The Role of Law in the Rule of Violence

This point is illustrated by the events that followed the Easter Rising of 1916.226 Acting upon the adage that "Ireland's opportunity is
England's adversity, '2 27 a small band of Irish nationalists plotted a
symbolic and hopeless rebellion. On Easter Monday, they unexpectedly seized several Dublin strongholds. To the surprise and
even amusement of the bystanders, the insurgents read a Proclamation of Independence which declared that Ireland "strikes for her
freedom" after "long usurpation of that right by a foreign people
and government. '2 28 By Saturday, with hundreds slain, the Easter
Rising was crushed. At first sight, it seemed, just another botched
Irish rebellion. But the British wartime administration, startled and
annoyed by unwanted distractions from an unwelcome quarter,
foolishly left retribution to the military. Over an increasingly tense
and brittle ten-day period, fifteen of the rebel leaders were methodically executed. A gang of high-minded hooligans were transformed
into a heroic procession of national martyrs.
In December 1918, the nationalists appropriated the elections,
contesting every Irish constituency, winning almost three quarters
of the seats, and then acting upon their vow to boycott the British
224. ADVICE TO THE RICH, supra note 136, at 18.
225. Cover, supra note 214, at 1605.
226. Unless otherwise indicated, the following account of historical events is drawn
fromJ.C. BECKETr, THE MAKING OF MODERN IRELAND, 1603-1923, at 438-61 (1981), and
R.F. FoSTER, MODERN IRELAND, 1600-1972, at 477-526 (1988).
227. R.F. FOSTER, supra note 226, at 479.
228. Proclamation of the Republic (Apr. 24, 1916), reprinted in R.F. FOSTER, supra note

226, at 597.
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parliament. Fully half of the newly elected revolutionary representatives would have found it difficult to attend Westminster anyway, as
they were already guests of state in Frongoch or other British prisons. Instead, they proclaimed themselves Dil Eireann, the parliament of a new Irish Republic. Their leader, Eamon De Valera, who
had escaped some months previously from an English prison, established a Provisional Government rivaling that of the British with its
own apparatus of courts and other official machinery.
By the middle of 1920, the British administration was contending
with regular, mounting and highly effective guerrilla warfare in Ireland. After much bitter, brutal and bloody fighting against the Black
and Tans, the battle-weary rebels accepted a partial victory. On December 6, 1921, they signed a treaty with the British, which recognized the Irish Free State but retained symbolic links to the crown
and omitted from its scope six northern counties with an overall
Unionist majority.
Civil war erupted. The extreme nationalists, or irreconcilables,
saw a betrayal of their republican cause. They were unpersuaded by
the moderates' view that partition and the other concessions paved
the way for total future independence and believed the war against
the British should have continued to the death. The Irish Republican Army split. The revolutionaries abruptly found themselves in
the midst of a struggle against their former comrades-in-arms, a
conflict as bloody as that they had just fought against their common
enemy. The pro-treaty forces in the civil war became known as the
"National" or "Free State" troops, while the anti-treaty republican
forces were called "Irregulars." Fighting began when the Free State
troops opened fire on a garrison of Irregulars that had taken over
the Four Courts, the headquarters of the Irishjudiciary. Before surrendering, the besieged republicans blew up the building, including
an irreplaceable collection of historical documents housed in the
public record office.
Prior to the fatally divisive treaty, the King's courts had continued
to administer prerevolutionary justice, a task they shared with the
British army. Both the civil and military courts competed with the
new revolutionary tribunals of the Provisional Government. English
precedent developed during the Boer War stood for the principle
that the civil courts must defer to military tribunals so long as the
country is shown to be in a state of war or armed rebellion. As Lord
Halsbury explained, "[i]f there is war, there is the right to repel
force by force," a theory which was untroubled by the fact that the
executive sometimes found it "convenient and decorous" to set up
military courts-martial to administer its dispensation of summary
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justice. 229 Following this rule, among the last decisions of the
King's courts in Ireland were several refusals to interfere with the
actions of the British army, even in one case where a death sentence
had been imposed by a military tribunal in flagrant disregard of a
statute establishing courts-martial and prescribing lesser penalties
for the same offense. 23 0 But, significantly, even by washing their
hands of the execution, the King's courts transformed an act of violence into one of law.
During the civil war that followed the collapse of the British regime, the revolutionary Free State courts applied the same rule of
deference to the military. As before, however, the judges insisted
upon their power to determine the existence of a state of war, rather
than merely accepting the word of an army officer. One judge,
O'Connor, M.R., had no hesitation on that score:
I am sitting here in this temporary makeshift for a Court ofJustice. Why? Because one of the noblest buildings in this country,
which was erected for the accomodation of the King's Courts and
was the home ofjustice for more than a hundred years, is now a
mass of crumbling ruins, the work of revolutionaries, who proclaim themselves the soldiers of an Irish Republic.
I know also that the Public Record Office (a building that might
well have been spared by even the most extreme of irreconcilables) has been reduced to ashes, with its treasures, which can
never be replaced.
I know also that railways have been torn up, railway stations
destroyed, the noblest mansions burned down, roadways made
impassable, bridges blown up, and life and property attacked in
almost every county in Southern Ireland.
If this is not a state of
1
war, I would like to know what is.23
Judge O'Connor accordingly refused to interfere with the actions of
the military court, established by the revolutionary Free State government, that had convicted a hostile republican prisoner for unlawful possession of arms and that was expected to impose the death
sentence. "No government can exist unless there is some physical
force behind it," Judge O'Connor reasoned. "Force must be met by
force, and violence by violence"; therefore, "[t]he ordinary law is
silenced by the sound of the pistol-shot and the bomb. ' 23 2 The unfortunate prisoner, Erskine Childers, was relegated by these words
to the tender mercies of the military tribunal. In truth, he was consigned to his grave. Words kill.
Childers, the English-born author of the well-known spy novel The
229. Tilonko v. Attorney General of the Colony of Natal, 1907 App. Gas. 93, 94 (P.C.
1906); see also Ex parte Marais, 1902 App. Cas. 109 (P.C. 1901).
230. The King v. Allen, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241 (K.B. 1921); see also The King (Garde) v.
Strickland, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 317 (K.B. 1921); The King (Ronayne) v. Strickland, [1921] 2
Ir. R. 333 (K.B. 1921). But see Egan v. Macready, 1921 1 Ir. R. 265 (Ch. Div. 1921).
231. The King (Childers) v. Adjutant General of the Provisional Forces, [1923] 1 Ir.
R. 5, 13 (Ch. Div. 1922).
232. Id. at 14.
NU-%T

W-ARA

Redefining Radicalism
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Riddle of the Sands (1903), had defected from serving the British government to become a diehard guerrilla officer and republican propagandist. While he was still on the loose, Childers' name was invoked
to justify passage of the emergency powers resolution that soon afterwards cost him his life. Kevin O'Higgins, the Irish Free State's
Minister for Home Affairs, declared that
the able Englishman who is leading those who are opposed to this
Government has his eye quite definitely on one objective, and that
is the complete breakdown of the economic and social fabric, so

that this thing that is trying so hard 2to
be an Irish nation will go
33
down in chaos, anarchy, and futility.
With such a prelude to its activities, the military tribunal's verdict
was never in doubt. Then, showing a somewhat cynical lack of interest in the proceedings of the civil courts, the revolutionary government executed Childers while his appeal
from Judge O'Connor's
23 4
denial of habeas corpus was pending.
Before he was shot, Childers extracted a promise from his sixteen-year-old son, Erskine Hamilton Childers, that the boy would
shake the hand of every person who figured in his father's execution. Did the boy shake the hand of O'Higgins? Curiously, in the
more genteel electoral politics of a half century later, the same civil
war being fought with the ballot in place of the bullet, this younger
Childers went on to defeat Tom O'Higgins, the nephew of his father's nemesis, by 636,167 votes to 587,577, and so become president of the Irish Republic that had cost so much blood to
construct. 235 Was this a pyrrhic for his dead father's spirit? Was
Hamlet's?
The Antigonean agony of the civil war tragedy was vividly illustrated again a mere fortnight later. Unknown assailants assassinated
an antagonistic lawmaker on his way to the Free State parliament
whose coveted legality could be protected only by violent uncaged
fury. As a violent deterrent against violence, the Free State army
requested that four republican prisoners-one for each provincebe taken out and shot without trial. O'Higgins unflinchingly agreed
to the summary execution of Rory O'Connor, who had been best
man at his wedding only a year before. 23 6 But despite this outwardly lawless and certainly grisly order, events soon demonstrated
that O'Higgins knew very well that successful violence must quickly
be cloaked in law.
233. 1 DAIL REPS. 859 (Sept. 27, 1922), quoted in D. MACARDLE, THE IRISH REPUBLIC
835 (1937).

234. D. MACARDLE, supra note 233, at 846.
235. B. WILKINSON, THE ZEAL OF THE CONVERT 232-33, 240 (1976). On the elder
Childers generally, see also T. Cox, DAMNED ENGLISHMAN (1975).
236. T. WHITE, KEVIN O'HIGGINs 128-32 (1948); see also D. MACARDLE, supra note
233, at 854-55.

This was shown the following year, when the judiciary stripped
the Free State government of its justification for military tribunals.
On May 24, 1923, de Valera, the spokesman for the Irregulars, announced a cease fire. On August 1, while acknowledging that there
was "no doubt, a certain amount of disorder" in the city of Dublin,
the Court of Appeal decided that a state of war or armed rebellion
no longer existed and accordingly granted writs of habeas corpus to
two prisoners of the revolutionary army. 23 7 This judicial announcement that the civil courts would no longer defer to the military
roused the Free State executive into immediate action. Within a
couple of days, the revolutionary government had enacted emergency legislation authorizing internment without trial on the suspicion of a government official and indemnifying the acts of the
military tribunals. 23 8 Did O'Higgins recall the words-"We were
probably the most conservative-minded revolutionaries that ever
put through a successful revolution"-he spoke when the original
insurgents struck their deal with the British and formed the Irish
23 9
Free State?
The bloodbath continued. OnJuly 10, 1927, O'Higgins was murdered. The following month legislation was passed authorizing
seven days detention on government suspicion 240 and the statute
was immediately used retroactively to detain one of the suspected
conspirators.2 4 1 Further violence in 1931 prompted particularly
draconian measures, including the creation of a special military tribunal to operate entirely outside the court system, the establishment of which was plainly contrary to the right to liberty contained
in the 1922 Constitution of the Irish Free State. Led by de Valera
(who later served as president and prime minister of the new republic when it eventually came into being), the extreme republicans,
who had for a time boycotted the revolutionary parliament rather
than recognize the monarchist and partitionist treaty with Britain,
loudly opposed such a drastic infringement of personal liberty. But
when these former irreconcilables abandoned their boycott and
came to office the following year, de Valera's followers revived the
same statute after only a token suspension.
A couple of years later, in the remarkable case State (Ryan) v. Lennon,2 4 2 a prisoner brought a constitutional challenge against this unprecedented statute. Article 50 of the 1922 Free State Constitution
allowed amendments by way of ordinary legislation for an eight-year
period. After that time, a popular referendum was to be required.
Invoking Article 50, the revolutionary legislature amended Article
50, thereby doubling the transition period set forth in Article 50! If
legally successful, this clever device would allow the revolutionary
237.
[1924]
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
97A

The King (O'Brien) v. Military Governor of the Military Internment Camp,
1 Ir. R. 32, 42 (C.A. 1923).
Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act No. 2 (1923); Indemnity Act (1923).
2 DAIL REPS. 11 (1923)
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government to continually amend the constitution and in effect to
suspend its operation permanently. The statute the legislature
sought to legitimate by this process allowed the government to detain suspects in blatant violation of the constitutional guarantee of
personal liberty that would otherwise have applied. In Ryan all
three Supreme Court judges were openly hostile to the sweeping
deprivation of individual rights that the legislature willed.
Referring to the extreme republicans' complete reversal of their
position as soon as they gained power, Justice Fitzgibbon grimly
noted that the statute had won almost unanimous parliamentary approval: "we have been told that those of our legislators by whom it
was opposed most vehemently as unconstitutional and oppressive,
when it was first introduced, have since completely changed their
opinions, and now accord it their unqualified approval." 24 3 An uncompromising positivist, however, Justice Fitzgibbon rejected the
contention that the challenged statute violated "certain rights inherent in every individual, which are so sacred that no Legislature has
authority to deprive him of them. ' 244 He found it impossible to
choose between "a doctrine that may be found in the writings of
Rousseau, Thomas Paine, William Godwin, and other philosophical
writers," but that was opposed by "Delolme and Burke, not to mention Bentham and Locke." 24 5 Borrowing from Thomas Jefferson,
he caustically observed that the framers of the document "may have
intended 'to bind man down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution,' but if they did, they defeated their object by handing him
the key of the padlock in Article 50."246 Justice Murnaghan was
equally disenchanted with the statute. He referred to its "extreme
rigour" as being "such that its provisions pass beyond anything having the semblance of legal procedure, and the judicial mind is staggered at the very complete departure from legal methods in use in
these Courts. ' 24 7 Unwillingly, it is true, both justices felt compelled
to uphold the statute's constitutionality.
Only Chief Justice Kennedy, in an impassioned dissent, voted to
strike it down. The first Attorney General and the first ChiefJustice
of the Irish Free State, Hugh Kennedy had been one of the drafters
of the 1922 Constitution. Two years before the Ryan case, he had
lamented that the transition clauses permitting amendments by ordinary legislation, intended only for trivial or technical changes, had
been "used for effecting alterations of a radical and far reaching
character, some of them far removed in principle from the ideas and
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
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ideals before the minds of the first authors of the instrument. ' 248
He was likely referring to the very statute that came before the
Supreme Court in Ryan. Later, in that case, Chief Justice Kennedy
pointed out that in the preamble of the 1922 Constitution it was
declared that all lawful authority derives from God to the people.
I find it impossible to reconcile as compatible with the Natural
Law the vesting in three military servants of the Executive, power
to impose as punishment for any offence within the indefinite, but
certainly extensive, ambit of the [statutory amendment of the
1922 Free State Constitution], the penalty of death, whenever
these three persons are of opinion that it is expedient.24 9
But out of the ashes of illegality arose the phoenix of a new constitutional order.
Thus, the British relied upon the rule of law to prevent revolution
and to impose their social order in Ireland. When revolutionaries
overthrew the British regime, the Free Staters in turn looked to the
rule of law to cement that revolution and to impose their vision of
society. And when, following a bitter civil war, de Valera ousted the
Free Staters and led his anti-treaty faction to political power in
1932, he used the law in exactly the same way.
In a jurisprudential sense, this progression mirrors Edmund Wilson's bluntly cynical zoological interpretation of American history.
Wilson maintained that most wars fought by human beings are stimulated primarily by the same instinct as the voracity of a primitive
sea slug that gobbles up smaller sea slugs. "The difference in this
respect between man and the other forms of life," said Wilson,
is that man has succeeded in cultivating enough of what he calls
'morality' and 'reason' to justify what he is doing in terms of what
he calls 'virtue' and 'civilization'. Hence the self-assertive sounds
which he utters when he is fighting and swallowing others: the
songs about glory and God, the speeches250about national ideals,
the demonstrations of logical ideologies.
In Wilson's view, "[tihese assertions rarely have any meaningthat is, they will soon lose any meaning they have had-once a war
has been got under way."' 251 He acknowledged that the situation
may indeed be a little more complicated after a successful revolution, but even then the primitive instinct controls.
The slogans that such a people shouts may at first express a real
exaltation on the part of some social group or country which has
succeeded in escaping from the clutches of some other group or
country that has been eating it, as well as enthusiastic hopes for
the freer and happier society which it hopes to construct in the
future. [A party] may at first fight a civil war, and then when the
once dominant power has been routed and dispossessed, still find
itself under the necessity of defending the new society set up by
248. Kennedy, Introduction to L. KOHN, CONsTrtrriON OF THE IRISH FREE STATE
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249.
250.
251.

see alsoJ.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 580 (1980).
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the revolution against the return of the former regime .... But
once the insurgent party has succeeded in imposing its own authority, if it feels itself strong enough to go farther, it will
devour
25 2
as much as it can, and its slogans will lose all meaning.
This primitive appetite for expansion, insisted Wilson, prompted
the French to transform their revolution into Napoleon's conquests
while they still chanted about "Libert6, Egalite, Fraternite"; it
spurred the Russians, in order to defend their revolution, to swallow
up the Balkan and the Baltic countries, indignantly denouncing "imperialism" all the way west. 253 "And now we Americans of the
United States," warned Wilson on the eve of Vietnam, "we too the
self-congratulatory grandchildren of a successful revolution but
driven, also, by the appetite for aggrandizement, have been adding
such terms as 'the American dream,' 'the American way of life' and
'the defense of the Free World' to these other forms of warlike
cant. 25 4 Wilson's Darwinian account of American history from the
that "we, too,
revolution to the Vietnam era was intended to show
255
are devourers and that we, too, are talking cant."
But one thing is for sure: the establishment always knows that the
violence of law, whether implicit or explicit, is indispensable to the
prevention of revolution. Revolutionaries always know that the violence of law, whether implicit or explicit, is equally indispensable to
the ultimate success of their forbidden enterprise. Whoever is on
top recognizes that if they hope to stay there the rule of violence
must quickly and effectively be converted into the rule of law. Successful violence must be cloaked in law.
B.

From Violence to Law

In attacking the common law, Sampson faced the radical dilemma.
His egalitarian political vision could only be secured by the violence
of law, and he was therefore committed to finding a way of defending the formalism-the rule of law-that he himself had challenged.
Sampson's answer was codification. But Sampson's codification
proposal was a pink elephant, ultimately subject to the formalist and
objectivist criticisms that he himself had launched at the common
law.
At the same time as he talks of revolutions and attacks formalism,
Unger too clings to the idea of law. Deviationist doctrine is Unger's
attempt to build a bridge from anarchy to order. Like Sampson's
call for codification, it is an effort to cross the divide between might
and right. Every one of Unger's attacks on formalism can be turned
252. IdL
253. Id at xii-xiii.
254. Id. at xiii.

255. Id.

back with equal force against his own concept of deviationist doctrine. He seeks to introduce a doctrinal practice that will exert "justified influence upon the exercise of state power" and that will
develop a legal system, step by step, "from some position initially
compatible with its authoritative materials, its institutional context,
and even its received canons of argument. ' 25 6 Yet, he wants to
avoid somehow the "arbitrary juxtaposition of easy analogy and
truncated theorizing that characterizes the most ambitious and coherent examples of legal analysis today." 2 57 Wobbling across this
tightrope from might to right, Unger is surely aware that he has set
himself an impossible task, but having called for revolution, he recognizes that revolutions require the violence of law to succeed. For
a social visionary, legal doctrine is as indispensable as it is indefensible. The new rule of law must become an active denial of the old
social order. Just as did Sampson a century and a half earlier, Unger
seeks to rescue the doctrine whose possibility he has destroyed.
Only then can he cloak violence with law and so create a new
society.
The constructive products of the radical critique-Sampson's
codification proposal and Unger's deviationist doctrine-rest on a
shared conception of the role of law in society. Morton Horwitz has
contrasted two early American conceptions of law:
If the Liberal idea of law was that it was a necessary evil, the
price that individuals needed to pay for a necessary degree of security, the Republican vision of law was as normative and constitutive of culture, and as potentially positive and emancipatory. Law
could create structures that enabled25 8individuals and communities
to fulfull their deepest aspirations.
Sampson saw the possibility of a codified legal system that would
advance the enterprise of a republican democracy. In that sense, his
was the so-called Republican vision of law. Unger shares that vision
when he criticizes present conceptions of law with the hope of replacing them with a positive and emancipatory alternative-deviationist doctrine and a new institutional program.
The radical dilemma of Sampson and Unger is experienced by all
idealists who see the rule of law as something more than an instrument of social control. Legal ideology plays a central role injustifying the exercise of state power, but it also legitimates the
revolutionary's resort to arms. It justifies controlling the daily lives
of men and women and visiting official violence upon them, but at
the same time it contains within it the vocabulary of social
change. 25 9 For those who are disillusioned with existing social
256. Unger, supra note 4, at 603.
257. Id. at 577.
258. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 1825, 1834 (1987). See generally The
Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988) (discussing the Republican conception of law and its relationship to individual rights).
259. M. TIGAR & M. LEvY, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPrrAusM 277-89 (1977). For discussion of this idea in specific contexts, see, e.g., Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331
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structures, the rule of law holds out the promise of transforming
society into a visionary alternative. Law has the richer, deeper potential to become a normative force, "a bridge linking a concept of
reality to an imagined alternative." 260 But whenever the rule of law
unleashes the awesome violence of the state upon individuals or
groups who dare to challenge that vision, law runs the risk of losing
any normative claim to obedience and reverting to its schizoid role
of simple domination.
The line between law as norm and law as institutionalized violence constantly shifts. In attempting to fix it, Cover sought to expose the significance of "commitment" in the creation of legal
meaning. In his view, distinguishing the raw violence of the state
from the sort of law that makes a normative claim to obedience demands that someone has accepted an objectie interpretation of the
legal word and has then faithftilly affirmed the resulting position
through some personal act of commitment. In the testing situation
where there exist two legal orders-for example, the competing regimes of the British and the Irish Provisional Government after
1918-it would be the force of individual interpretive commitments
that ultimately determined what law means and what law shall be.
Assuming equally predictable patterns of public force, the competing legal regimes would differ to the extent that one was based upon
precepts that were universally venerated and the other upon
precepts regarded as fundamentally unjust.2 6 1
In this calculation, although by no means the only one, "violence
is one extremely powerful measure and test of commitment." 26 2 As
we have seen, the legitimacy of violence (whether it be that of state
agents such as judges or executioners or that of dissidents such as
the United Irishmen or the American revolutionaries) tends to be
judged by the result. This is the true test of legality. Sampson was
an intellectual revolutionary, but not by nature a violent one. He
abhorred bloodshed. In a vivid illustration of his revolutionary
commitment to a higher normative law that diverged from that of
the sovereign-a commitment that confounded the distinction between obedience to and defiance of the rule of law-Sampson
wrote: "I would not willingly be a rebel; yet if driven to the cruel
extremity of deciding between treason and rebellion, I felt for which
I was best fitted, and that I should rather die a rebel than live a
traitor. '2 63 He warned the rich that "to the just resistance of the
(1988); Schneider, The Dialecticof Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
260. Cover, supra note 215, at 9.
261. Id. at 7, 44-60.
262. Id at 11 n.30.
263. MEMOIRS, supra note 120, at 99.
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people is owing every thing boasted of in our political theory." 2 64
He insisted that "if a government be so manifestly against a people,
and a people so manifestly against a government: if a kingdom must
be put out of the king's peace, in order that a faction may monopolize royal power, it may be fairly asked, on which side is rebellion?"265
Even Blackstone accepted Locke's justification of revolution on
the ground that " 'there remains still inherent in the people a
supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the
legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them ....

,,266
"

Simi-

larly, that phlegmatic American Joseph Story recognized "a remedy
never provided for by human institutions. It is by a resort to the
ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply force against ruinous injustice." 26 7 In discovering
what is the rule of law, we are again reminded that the simple difference between treason and constitutional legitimacy is the thin erratic line that separates victory from defeat.
But normative revolutionary resistance to a rule of law imposed
by the state requires an extraordinary commitment-whether passive or aggressive-to the future promised by the alternative legal
text. Cover, who was not the cynic that Edmund Wilson professed
to be, put it this way:
For a group to live its law in the face of the predictable employment of violence against it requires a new elaboration of "law"the development of an understanding of what is right and just in
the violent contexts that the group will encounter. The group
must understand the normative implications of struggle and the
meaning of suffering and must accept268
responsibility for the results
of the confrontation that will ensue.
This "understanding" may include accepting responsibility for
shedding blood or for others' shedding of it. Resistance against the
established law in the name of an alternative interpretive commitment to a higher law demands recognition of the implications of
living as a victim or as a perpetrator of violence in the multiple contexts in which violence is likely to arise. 2 69
Conclusion: The Lessons of Incongruity
Revolutionaries and government officials are therefore equally
dependent upon both violence and law for the realization of their
264. ADVICE TO THE RIcn, supra note 136, at 7.
265. W. SAMPSON, MEMOIRS OF WILLIAM SAMPSON; INCLUDING PARTICULARS OF His
ADVENTURES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF EUROPE. . ., at v (Virginia 1817). This cite is to the
1817 American edition of Sampson's Memoirs. The 1832 London edition cited in footnote 120 misquotes this passage.
266. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *157 (quotingJ. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 385 (P. Laslett 3d ed. 1967) (1st ed. 1698)).

267. 1J. STORY,
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at 374-75 (Boston 1833).
268. Cover, supra note 215, at 49.
269. Id. at 49-50 & n.133.
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competing social visions. Each must successfully appropriate the violence of law. Let us conclude our study of the radical dilemma by
glancing at another bloody tragedy of revolutionary legality.
Cover recounts the events that followed the military coup in
Ghana on June 4, 1979.270 In marked contrast to the relatively passive Irish judiciary following the Easter Rising, several Ghanaian
judges insisted upon their power to review the violent actions of the
military during the conflict. Like the dissenting Chief Justice Kennedy in Ryan, despite newly-minted constitutional provisions expressly to the contrary, these courageous Ghanaian judges rejected
positivist interpretations of the legal text. Instead they appealed to
an alternative normative understanding of the governing law. The
next time the military intervened, at least three of these judges were
killed for living out their interpretive commitments. Appointed as
the agents of state violence, these brave judges died as its victims
rather than its perpetrators.
Law is violence. Whether it emancipates or enslaves depends on
who is in charge, and how long it has been since the last revolution,
and how long it will be until the next. Tarzan, Blackstone, Bentham,
Sampson, ChiefJustice Kennedy, Justice Fitzgibbon, and Unger, all
have struggled to pierce the mystery of the written word. Law is the
written word that is pregnant with violence. In this Essay I have
tried to show that in his recognition of the capacity of law to disguise violence and so legitimate political domination, Unger follows
Sampson. I have also tried to show that Sampson confronted and
Unger now confronts the radical dilemma: the perception that the
violence of law can overcome domination just as it can be subservient to it.
Sampson's and Unger's responses to this common perceptioncodification and deviationist doctrine-are both attempts to distinguish law from brute violence. These constructive programs crumble, however, under the force of their authors' own theoretical
critiques of formalism and objectivism. But in practice, as the Easter
Rising showed, the legitimized violence of law is as necessary for
revolutionaries to accomplish their forbidden enterprise as it is for
the establishment to prevent them.
Successful violence must be cloaked in law. Individual normative
commitments, which may precipitate violence in rebellion or martyrdom, give law its normative force. But the rule of law seeks to
270. Id at 59 n.164.
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divide right from might, to publicly separate the infliction of violence from the assertion of private will. And law licenses the perpetuation or even the revolutionary imposition, in each case by way of
violence, of a particular social order. These, to steal Unger's
phrase, are the lessons of incongruity.
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